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A NOTE TO WAR GAMERS 
To recreate and play the scenarios of the Battle of Philippine Sea and Battle of Leyte Gulf 
as described in this paper, war gamers will need the full versions of Avalon Hill’s 
MIDWAY and GUADALCANAL naval war games (the 1992 versions), as well as the 









MIDWAY, GUADALCANAL, AND THE GENERAL ARE OWNED BY AVALON HILL.  
THE SCENARIOS OF PHILIPPINE SEA AND LEYTE GULF THAT USED RULES 
AND COUNTERS FROM THE MIDWAY, GUADALCANAL, AND THE GENERAL 




There are two cherished myths in American popular culture about World War II.  
Purveyed through classrooms and television, they are used as examples of the quality and 
character of our troops, their firm belief in a just cause and their uncanny sacrifice of the 
self to the group, that evoke of the greatest traditions from the Roman Republic.  The first 
myth is that the Wehrmacht, man for man, was the finest Armed Force in the world.  The 
second myth is that although the U.S developed a “Germany First” policy, the meager 
forces devoted to the Pacific were more than a match for the Japanese forces led by 
incompetent officers and that after Guadalcanal, and Americans never really came close 
to defeat despite Pearl Harbor.  
In our education here at The Ohio State University, our professors have worked 
hard to dispel these myths.  Recent evidence suggests that by 1944-1945, the U.S army 
achieved an operational capacity that far outmatched anything that the Germans had 
achieved earlier in the war.  In the Pacific, the myth of poor leadership on the Japanese 
side was dispelled, but on last question remained; did the Japanese Navy possess any 
combat capability after 1942? 
Mark Gribbell’s senior thesis is an attempt to answer that question.  His stirring 
narrative sheds new light on questions; such as how much did the degradation of the IJN 
carrier pilots affect the campaigns of 1944?  He also asks, could the Japanese have won a 
decisive naval engagement after Guadalcanal?  The reality bore out on meticulously 
recreated wargaming scenarios is compelling.  Before this project I had bought into the 
long cherished tradition that in World War II the battleship was no longer a potent 
offensive weapon, but the results of this thesis indicate otherwise. 
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This senior thesis is the result of hard work, a single-minded sense of purpose, 
and a grasp of the operational situation that can only come from exhaustive research.  I 
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The USS Enterprise at sea. 
Except for three Japanese cruisers,  
the Enterprise was the only ship to  
fight at Midway, the three carrier battles  
at Guadalcanal, Philippine Sea, and  
Leyte Gulf.  Unlike the three Japanese  
cruisers, the Enterprise played a major 
role in all six battles and survived the  




Two of the greatest naval battles of all time, the Battle of Philippine Sea and the Battle of 
Leyte Gulf, are the topic of this thesis.  These two battles also represented the death of 
the Imperial Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force.  By 1941 the Japanese had 
constructed what was arguably the world’s most powerful navy, with modernized 
battleships, carriers manned with top pilots, and surface forcers armed with unsurpassed 
torpedoes and night fighting skills. 
 Unfortunately for the Japanese, their pilot replacement program was extremely 
inadequate.  After taking horrific airplane losses in the carrier battles at Midway and 
Guadalcanal in 1942, the Japanese found themselves seriously lacking skilled pilots.  
They attempted a hasty pilot replacement program, and the resultant pilots faced off with 
the American fleet at the Battle of Philippine Sea in June 1944 and were annihilated in 
what American pilots labeled ‘The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’.  Their carrier air arm 
ruined, the Japanese attempted to use surface forces to stop the American landings at the 
Philippines in October 1944, which resulted in the Battle of Leyte Gulf – the largest naval 
battle in history.  The Japanese failed once again, leaving their once mighty navy little 
more then a historical curiosity. 
 Modern scholars agree that the lack of skilled Japanese pilots greatly assisted the 
American war effort.  But what would have happened if the Japanese did have skilled 
pilots in 1944?  This question seems to not have received much more then a cursory 
discussion in academia, and this thesis is an attempt to answer that question. 
 To study the effects of skilled Japanese pilots at the Battles of Philippine Sea and 
Leyte Gulf, the rules and game systems of the war games MIDWAY and 
GUADALCANAL, made by Avalon Hill in 1992, have been modified and new scenarios 
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for the battles were created.  New rules were necessary to accurately recreate the 1944 
battles and the capabilities and/or shortcomings of the American and Japanese Navies.  
The modified rules and new scenarios, along with all the information needed to recreate 
and play these scenarios, can be found in the appendices. 
The need to war game these two battles to test the skilled Japanese pilots is vital, 
for without the war gaming experiences this paper would be little more then theory and 
would have a negligible amount of hard data to draw conclusions from.  But the 
MIDWAY and GUADALCANAL game systems are not perfect.  Using ten sided dice, a 
whole multitude of outcomes can result, and the games can often be bloodthirsty.  This 
accurately reflects the Battle of Midway.  At Midway, a single dive bomber squadron 
inflicted lethal damage on four Japanese carriers four times in a row.  In order for this to 
be recreated, the bombing values have to be increased, and would therefore affect all 
other games and game aspects when the exceptional situation faced at Midway did not 
repeat itself, mostly because of better Japanese planning and decision making.  I have 
made appropriate considerations when analyzing the results of the play tested battles. 
Another shortfall is the inaccuracy of flying times.  The game turns are four hours 
in length, and in that amount of time a bomber squadron can take off from its base, attack 
its target 700 miles away, and return to that base.  Such a task would not take four hours, 
but more like twelve.  Again, I have made the appropriate considerations in my analysis 
of the play tested battles. 
One last flaw is the ability to search with perfect intelligence.  If a scouting 
airplane flies into the same area as an enemy fleet, that enemy fleet is automatically 
found.  In World War II search planes often flew right over opposing forces without 
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spotting them.  One major example is during the Battle of Midway when a Japanese scout 
plane went right over the American fleet early in the battle without noticing it. 
Even so, the MIDWAY and GUADALCANAL game systems were used for their 
simplicity, and for their relatively short playing times that made it feasible to test a 
considerable number of alternative scenarios.  Finally, once suitably modified they offer 
credible results within an acceptable degree of error, an important aspect of this study 
that I confirmed by playing actual historical scenarios with several players; in each case 
the outcome was very close to the historical results.  Playing these games has been 
enjoyable and revealing.  More important, I believe that they have given us significant 
new insights into World War II at sea that extends beyond the concluding phases of the 














‘Murderer’s Row’ anchored at Ulithi 
in December 1944, consisting of the  
Essex class carriers Wasp (II),  
Yorktown (II), Hornet (II), Hancock,  
Ticonderoga, and Lexington (II).  The  
quality and quantity of the Essex class  
carriers presented an almost unsolvable  
problem for the Japanese to deal with. 
 
 
“Task Force 58 must cover Saipan and  
our forces engaged in that operation.” 




The question of whether it is better to have quantity or quality has been long debated in 
military history.  Unfortunately for Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, the commander of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy’s carrier forces in June of 1944, his opponents in the American 
Navy possessed the advantage in both areas.  Facing fifteen carriers, with 94 escorting 
ships, and 956 aircraft, Ozawa could only muster nine carriers, 41 escorts, and 473 
aircraft1. 
 Since 1942 both Navies had rearmed their air groups with newer and more 
advanced airplanes.  The American carriers now used the F6F ‘Hellcat’ fighter, the SB2C 
‘Helldiver’ dive bomber, and the TBM ‘Avenger’; however, the Enterprise still used the 
older SBD ‘Dauntless’ dive bomber, but also carried the new F4U ‘Corsair’ fighter.  The 
Japanese were now using the A6M5 ‘Zero’ fighter (an upgraded version of the A6M2 
used during 1942), the D4Y ‘Judy’ dive bomber (although the Junyo and Hiyo still used 
the older D3A ‘Val’), and the B6N ‘Jill’ torpedo bomber.  While the American and 
Japanese planes were roughly equal on paper, the Hellcat was markedly superior to the 
Zero in speed, rate of clime, and engine power.2
 However the most important difference between the fleets was the amount of 
training and experience of the pilots.  In 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) pilots 
received 700 hours of training while their counterparts in the United States Navy (USN) 
received only 305 hours.  But by 1944 the Japanese pilot training had been cut to only 
275 hours due to a crash course undertaken by the Japanese Navy to rebuild their air arm 
and by the lack of fuel available in the Japanese Empire.  Conversely the American Navy 
increased their training to 525 hours by 1944.3
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 Indeed, not only was the training increased, but also the size and scope of the 
American military had reached a phenomenal level.  After breaking through the Gustav 
line in Italy and out of the Anzio beachhead on 23 May 1944, American and Allied 
troops captured Rome on 4 June while pursuing German troops up the Italian peninsula.  
Two days later America and her allies launched Operation Overlord and successfully 
landed at Normandy.  Back in the Pacific, MacArthur’s troops occupied Hollandia on 
New Guinea on 22 April, and proceeded to land on Biak Island on 27 May.  Finally on 11 
June the USN raided the Mariana Islands and American troops hit the beaches of Saipan 
four days later.  In summary the United States preformed an unprecedented feat of 
military power projection in less then two months, with soldiers, ships, and airplanes 
successfully going on the offensive in four separate theaters, all far away from home4. 
 The Japanese originally decided to attempt to relieve Biak, but after several failed 
attempts and news of American raids on the Marianas, the Japanese Navy sortied to 
engage the American battle fleet, Task Force 58, in the Philippine Sea.  Admiral Ozawa, 
realizing that his pilots were not up to caliber, still had two advantages: the longer range 
of some of his aircraft over their American adversaries, and a favorable wind direction.  
Ozawa decided to use both in an attempt to attack Task Force 58 and remain out of range 
of American counterattacks.  His pilots would use Guam as a refueling station, but 
unknown to Ozawa, the situation on Guam was much worse then the base’s commander 
had reported. 
 In command the 5th Fleet, Admiral Raymond Spruance decided to allow the 
Japanese to strike first (much to the protest of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander 
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of Task Force 58) so his fleet could continue covering the landings on Saipan and not be 
drawn into what might become a wild goose chase5. 
 
Game 1: Historical scenario 
United States player: Mark Gribbell 
Japanese player: Fred Gribbell 
Historical rules are in effect (Rule 1d) 
 
Turn 8: 19 June 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 American carriers launched over 200 fighters for CAP (Combat Air Patrol) at 
dawn along with several search patrols to look for the Japanese fleet.  The search planes 
successfully located the Japanese C Force, but the Japanese were also successful in their 
searches, locating both Task Groups 58.1 and 58.7.  The Japanese light carrier Chiyoda 
managed to survive an attack from an American submarine and two Japanese strikes 
attacked the American fleet.  The first strike, directed at Task Group 58.7, ran into a hail 
of American F6F interceptors and anti-aircraft (AA) fire, and the strike scored no hits.  
The second strike attacked Task Group 58.1, and while its pilots almost hit the light 
carrier Bataan, this strike was also beaten off with heavy losses from interceptors and AA 
fire.  Together, the two strikes lost 15 squadrons while the American CAP suffered no 
serious casualties. 
Turn 9: 19 June 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 While the US fleet maintained their CAP, the Japanese launched another strike, 
this time after Task Group 38.4.  Again attacking in two waves, the Japanese lost another 
12 squadrons to American interceptors and AA, while only scoring a near miss on the 
carrier Essex, which caused negligible damage.  The Japanese fleet was not so lucky, as 
the prowling submarine Albacore attacked and sank the carrier Hiyo. 
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Turn 10: 19 June 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 American fighter patrols at Guam managed to catch two squadrons of Japanese 
planes attempting to take off from the base, and promptly shot both down, bringing total 
Japanese losses to 29 squadrons (over 300 aircraft).  The submarine Muskallunge 
followed up on the Albacore’s success by attacking and sinking the Japanese flagship, the 
heavy carrier Taiho. 
Turn 11: 19 June 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 Both the Americans and Japanese managed to keep fixes on each other’s fleets, 
and while the Japanese turned west to retire from the battle, the Americans set out in 
pursuit. 
Turns 12 and 13: 19 – 20 June 1944, 2000 – 0400 
 Both fleets proceeded westward during the night and prepared for air operations 
for the following morning. 
Turn 14: 20 June 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 After scouts from the carrier Enterprise located the Japanese fleet, the Americans 
launched a tremendous strike, while the Japanese launched every fighter they could into 
their CAP.  However, American escort fighters smashed right through the Japanese CAP, 
downing six squadrons while losing only twenty planes, and the American bombers 
proceeded unhindered.  While Japanese AA fire shot down almost thirty aircraft, the 
Americans proceeded to sink the carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku, and the light carrier Chitose, 
while damaging the carrier Junyo and light carrier Chiyoda.  After the American strike 
finished the Japanese managed to break off from the battle and the US fleet returned to 
support the landings on Saipan, thus ending the battle. 
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LOSSES: The Americans lost 50 aircraft in combat along with several scouting patrols, 
but suffered no damage to their ships.  The Japanese lost 35 squadrons (over 350 aircraft) 
while losing the Taiho and Hiyo to submarines, and the Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Chitose to 
American strikes.  With five carriers sunk and over 350 aircraft shot down while 
suffering few losses themselves, the American Navy decisively won the Battle of 
Philippine Sea. 
 
 Historically the Japanese lost the carriers Taiho, Shokaku, and Hiyo, as well as 
426 aircraft, while the Americans lost a total of 130 planes, 82 of which were lost while 
trying to return to their carriers after a strike on the Japanese fleet at sunset on 20 June.  
Japanese bombers only managed to score a single minor hit on the battleship South 
Dakota6. 
 While the aircraft losses roughly match the losses historically, the number of 
ships sunk is much different.  This was due to high die rolls and the fact that the final 
American strike was much larger then the air strike made on 20 June.  Even so, the game 
turned out matching history relatively closely.  Only five Japanese carriers were sunk 
instead of three, and while the timing of the American counter strike was off (the 
American strike hit at dusk, not in the morning), this was due to restrictions on the map 
board. 
 
Game 2: Thesis scenario 
United States player: Fred Gribbell 
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
Japanese player uses printed values on aircraft counters 
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Turn 8: 19 June 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 With both the Japanese and American scouts locating each other’s fleets, the two 
sides quickly put every plane they could muster into the air, with the Japanese launching 
almost 100 fighters into their CAP along with over 200 launched to attack the American 
fleet in two waves.  The strikes were directed to Task Group 58.2, and the first strike 
attacked and hit both the carrier Bunker Hill and the light carrier Cabot.  In response, 
American AA and fighters shot down over 70 aircraft.  Although the second wave lost 
another 70 aircraft, it was more successful as both the Bunker Hill and Cabot were 
seriously damaged during the strike. 
 Soon after the Taiho escaped a submarine attack undamaged, the first American 
strike zeroed in on the Japanese fleet.  The Japanese CAP managed to hold off the 
American fighters, with both sides loosing about 40 planes, while the US bombers 
suffered another twenty planes shot down by Japanese AA fire.  However, the American 
strike hit the carriers Taiho, Shokaku, and the light carrier Chiyoda, while sinking the 
Pearl Harbor veteran Zuikaku. 
 The Japanese CAP proved less effective against the second American strike, 
losing over twenty planes while the US strike lost only fifteen planes total between the 
Japanese fighters and AA fire.  American bombers sank the carrier Taiho, while seriously 
damaging the Shokaku and hitting the battleship Musashi. 
Turn 9: 19 June 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 Both fleets prepared for further air operations later in the day, but an American 
submarine managed to put a torpedo into the Shokaku, further damaging the large carrier.  
The US fleet managed to launch a small strike against the Japanese and, facing no fighter 
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opposition, sank the Shokaku and seriously damaged the Hiyo while losing just over ten 
planes to AA fire.  The loss of the Shokaku proved disastrous to the Japanese fleet, as she 
was carrying the bulk of the remaining Japanese fighters at the time she went down. 
Turn 10: 19 June 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 The Japanese launched thirty fighters into their CAP (a noticeable difference from 
when, on Turn 8, the Japanese put 100 fighters into the CAP), and launched about 150 
aircraft to strike the American fleet.  After the Junyo dodged a submarine attack the first 
American strike reached the Japanese fleet.  In the ensuing action, AA fire shot down 
almost 80 US planes while American bombers sank the light carrier Zuiho, seriously 
damaged the Chitose and Chiyoda and hit the Ryuho and heavy carrier Hiyo.  In the 
following second strike the Japanese lost twenty fighters in their CAP and the Americans 
lost over thirty planes, mostly from AA fire.  However, American bombers sank the light 
carrier Ryuho and heavily damaged the Junyo.  The two Japanese strikes were far less 
successful, as over 100 planes were lost, but the Bunker Hill was hit once again. 
Turn 11: 19 June 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 The Americans launched a small strike as the Japanese fleet rapidly retreated 
west.  During the raid the US lost about 50 aircraft while sinking the Hiyo (with twenty 
planes onboard) and hitting the Junyo.  A successful submarine attack subsequently sank 
the Junyo.  During the night the Japanese fleet successfully broke contact with the USN, 
concluding the battle. 
LOSSES:  The Americans lost about 250 planes (largely from AA fire) and suffered 
serious damage to the Cabot and Bunker Hill.  However, the Japanese lost over 370 
aircraft as well as the carriers Taiho, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo, Hiyo, the light carriers 
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Zuiho and Ryuho, suffered severe damage to the Chitose and Chiyoda, and minor damage 
to the battleship Musashi.  Overall, after sustaining relatively little damage while sinking 
seven carriers in return, the United States, once again, decisively won the Battle of 
Philippine Sea. 
 
 The trained Japanese pilots achieved little more then their poorly trained 
counterparts.  In both games the Japanese lost roughly the same number of planes, and in 
the thesis scenario, they only damaged the Cabot and Bunker Hill.  In return, the 
American player lost nearly five times as many aircraft (because of better AA rolls on the 
Japanese part, not to the better Japanese fighter squadrons), but sank seven carriers due to 
increased aggressiveness on the player’s part.  While this scenario shows that even 
trained Japanese pilots would be unable to change the outcome of the battle, it also shows 
what may have happened if Spruance allowed Mitscher to be more aggressive, since the 
American player fought without any restrictions. 
 
Game 3: Elite pilots scenario 
United States player: Fred Gribbell 
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
Japanese player uses setup detailed in Rule 1f.  Rule 1d is nullified. 
Turn 8: 19 June 0400 – 0800 
 The Japanese and American fleets launched extensive CAPs and searches, but 
both fleets also moved in opposite directions, yielding no contacts or combats. 
Turn 9: 19 June 0800 – 1200 
 Both sides prepared aircraft for further operations and the Americans launched a 
small raid on Guam, which destroyed Japanese six planes on the ground. 
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Turn 10: 19 June 1200 – 1600 
 The Japanese launched two large strikes against the American fleet while the 
USN launched a massive CAP and a fighter sweep against the Japanese fleet.  The first 
Japanese strike managed to effectively hold off the American CAP, shooting down six of 
the US planes.  The strike proceeded to seriously damage the carrier Lexington (II) while 
hitting the Essex, but lost 70 planes to the American CAP and AA. 
 The second Japanese strike proved much less effective, and as the Japanese 
escorts and American CAP battled indecisively, Japanese bombers scored another hit on 
the Essex.  In whole the strike lost 60 planes, while damage on the American carriers 
wrecked ten American planes. 
 Meanwhile, the US fighter sweep over the Japanese fleet shot down 25 planes 
while the Americans lost less than twenty aircraft. 
Turn 11: 19 June 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 Shrewdly holding back their bombers while absorbing the Japanese strike, the 
Americans launched a devastating counterattack against the Imperial Navy.  The 
Japanese lost thirty planes to American fighters as well as the carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku, 
and Taiho to the American bombers.  Over 50 planes were sunk along with the carriers 
while only 40 American planes did not return to their carriers. 
Turns 12 and 13: 19 – 20 June 1944, 2000 – 0400 
 The Japanese fleet rapidly sailed west with the American fleet in pursuit, and both 
fleets prepared their aircraft for the next morning. 
Turn 14: 20 June 1944, 0400 – 0800 
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 The Japanese fleet continued to proceed west as the Americans continued 
pursuing and launched two strikes.  The first strike shot down over thirty Japanese planes 
while the Imperial Navy’s CAP and AA fire shot down 70 American aircraft.  US 
bombers proceeded to sink the carrier Junyo, and the light carriers Zuiho, and Ryuho, 
while severely damaging the carriers Hiyo, Chiyoda, and Chitose.  The second wave 
suffered over thirty planes lost to the Japanese, but shot down another 25 planes of the 
Japanese CAP, sinking the Hiyo, and further damaging the Chitose and Chiyoda. 
LOSSES:  The Japanese lost over 290 aircraft while the Americans lost nearly 200.  
American bombers outclassed their Japanese counterparts, sinking the Shokaku, Zuikaku, 
Taiho, Junyo, Hiyo, Zuiho, and Ryuho, and damaging the Chiyoda and Chitose, while the 
Japanese only damaged two American carriers (which could be easily repaired later) in 
return.  Although aircraft losses were much more even in this game, the Japanese loss of 
seven carriers with nothing to show for it allowed the Americans to claim yet another 
decisive victory for the Battle of Philippine Sea. 
 
 Although aircraft losses were much more even with the elite Japanese pilots, the 
Japanese were unable to cause any additional damaged to the American fleet, and again 
lost seven aircraft carriers. 
 But why are the Americans able to continually win such decisive victories?  As 
experience in the gaming showed, the dominant weapon in the Battle of the Philippine 
Sea is the F6F Hellcat.  In June 1944 American fleet carriers generally carried about 
thirty to 40 Hellcats each while the light carriers each added about another twenty.  In 
total, Task Force 58 carried 433 Hellcats, plus another 36 in night group detachments 
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(along with four Corsairs)7, nearly equaling the total number of planes, fighters and 
bombers, the Japanese carriers could put into the air.  Given their additional qualitative 
superiority over the A6M Zero, the Hellcat dominated every air battle as they fought off 
enemy attacks and shielded the American bombers from enemy fighters, allowing the 
bombers to hit their targets without the threat of enemy aircraft. 
 Could the Americans have won without the F6F Hellcat?  Instead of the F6F, the 
Americans would have the F4F Wildcat.  Despite being less maneuverable and speedy 
then the F6F and A6M, the F4F proved itself to be quite rugged and powerful.  
Unfortunately, the Americans developed several tactics in 1942 to deal with the Japanese 
Zeros, namely, the Thatch Weave.8  In 1944 the Wildcats would still be able to hold off 
the Japanese fighters with great proficiency, but Japanese bombers would probably be 
able to get through to the main American fleet, and then would become the problem of 
the US AA gunners. 
 But the American anti-aircraft capabilities presented yet another major problem 
for the Japanese.  In 1942 the American anti-aircraft proved lethal to Japanese pilots.  At 
the Battle of Santa Cruz dozens of Japanese bombers, flown by pilots far better then those 
at Philippine Sea, were shot down attempting to attack the Enterprise, which was only 
covered by a battleship, a heavy cruiser, a light anti-aircraft cruiser, and eight destroyers.  
At Philippine Sea each carrier group had three or four carriers, three to five cruisers, and 
twelve to fourteen destroyers9, each with considerably more anti-aircraft guns then their 
counterparts from 1942.  Also, American fire control had become greatly centralized 
through the introduction of the CIC (Combat Information Center), allowing the USN to 
direct their defensive fire clearly and with devastating effect. 
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 American AA guns also gained a powerful new enhancement after Guadalcanal: 
the proximity fuse.  Proximity fuses would detonate the AA shell when the projectile 
came within a certain distance of an airplane, turning near misses into hits.  Although 
proximity fuses were in relatively small supply throughout the war, they proved 
devastating against attacking Japanese aircraft. 
 The US Navy’s carrier doctrine was also another strike against the Japanese.  In a 
series of raids by their carrier groups in late 1943 and early 1944, the American fast 
carrier task force became a well-oiled and operated machine.  US carriers could land, 
rearm, and take off airplanes faster and more efficiently then any other navy in the world.  
Therefore, the Japanese had no hope of catching the American fleet off guard, as 
hundreds of fighters could be maintained in the US CAP at all times. 
 What could the Japanese have done to counter the American quantitative and 
qualitative edges?  To start, the Imperial Navy could have simply built more carriers and 
aircraft.  Indeed, the Japanese were planning to build another six Taiho class carriers 
(beyond the Taiho herself) as well as six Amagi class carriers, but all these ships would 
not be completed for at least two more years, and the Japanese needed a much quicker 
solution. 
 One possibility is that Japan could have built aircraft carriers instead of the 
Yamato class battleships, and could yield roughly two or three Shokaku class carriers, and 
their air groups, for each Yamato (six to nine carriers)10.  However, given the fact that the 
Yamatos were build in the first place, and the Japanese high command’s inability and 
unwillingness to see reality, it is unlikely that the Japanese would change their minds, no 
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matter who or what suggested otherwise.  Also a large Japanese carrier building program 
might prompt the Americans to start their own carrier program earlier. 
 But simply building more carriers would not solve all of Japan’s problems, as 
American carriers were of far better quality.  An Essex class carrier could carry twenty to 
thirty planes more then the average Japanese carrier, which meant the Japanese would 
have to build even more carriers then the Americans in order to catch up to the USNs 
qualitative edge. 
 Instead of building more aircraft carriers, the Japanese could have gone another 
route and tried building large quantities of submarines like the Kriegsmarine.  The 
Japanese submarines proved very effective in 1942, sinking the carriers Yorktown and 
Wasp, and the light cruiser Juneau.  However, using tactics developed in the Atlantic, the 
Americans began hunting down and eliminating the Japanese submarine threat against 
their operations by this time of the war.  Building mass quantities of midget submarines 
would be more economically efficient for the Japanese, but would not be very useful.  
Midget submarines would not be able to operate well on the high seas and lack the speed 
to be able to intercept American carrier task forces. 
 Overcoming the American qualitative edge in aircraft presented another problem 
for the Japanese.  The United States continually designed and redesigned their airplanes 
throughout World War II and the Japanese proved unable or unwilling to do the same 
with their designs.  This is not to say that the Japanese did not produce newer and better 
aircraft, but that these new planes were not designed and built as quickly as their 
American counterparts.  For example, in response to the stunning abilities of the A6M 
Zero, the F6F Hellcat was designed, tested, and built in about a year (becoming available 
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in early 1943), whereas it was not until early 1944 or later that new Japanese planes, such 
as the Ki-84 ‘Frank’ and Ki-100, became available11.  Not only did it take longer for 
these designs to be produced, but these higher performance machines also required 
substantial high quality materials, materials that the Japanese seriously lacked even in 
1942. 
 However, a Japanese effort to build more carriers and planes would have serious 
problems.  Any attempt to change the Japanese construction plans would have to be made 
in 1937, when the Yamato was laid down, and it is doubtful that any time traveler would 
be able to convince the Japanese high command that such a drastic change would be 
necessary.  Not only would the building programs have to start before the war, but 
Japanese attempts to out produce the Americans would be an impossible task, as Japan’s 
armaments spending was only about a seventh that of the United States in 194412.  Also, 
the Japanese Naval commanders only became truly aware of how serious a problem they 
had on their hands after Philippine Sea, and by then it was too late to start any kind of 
building program.   
 Instead the Japanese would have to start using different tactics against their 
opponents.  One tactic would be to fly attack planes individually or in small groups which 
may not be picked up by American radar and possibly reach the carriers.  A single dive 
bomber managed to sink the light carrier Princeton during the Battle of Leyte Gulf with a 
well placed hit.  Unfortunately such a tactic would require either naturally capable or 
moderately well trained pilots, as they would need to navigate to their targets by 
themselves. 
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 What the Japanese needed was a quick, low tech, solution that could harness what 
resources they possessed, namely a lot of older planes and many of men ready to die for 
the Emperor.  Putting the two resources together formed the Kamikaze, which was first 
successfully used during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.  Kamikazes reached their intensity in 
1945 over Okinawa, and before the war ended they hit the carriers Essex, Intrepid, 
Hancock, Cabot, Ticonderoga, Langley (II), Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Enterprise, and 
Hancock, as well as damaging hundreds and sinking dozens of other vessels13.  Although 
the USN was forming new counter measures against the Kamikazes, American sailors 
feared even worse destruction during the invasion of Japan, and this played no small role 
in using the Atom bomb14.  However, Kamikazes were not a perfect solution.  By the end 
of hostilities the Japanese were drafting pilots at gunpoint, and British carriers, with their 
armored flight decks, proved impervious to Kamikaze attack. 
 In conclusion, the Japanese could not have done anything to stop the American 
fleet in the Philippine Sea in 1944.  Admiral Ozawa handled his ships and planes well, 
but in the end it was the massive American technological and quantitative edge that 
defeated him.  As a result of the Battle of Philippine Sea, the IJN would never be able to 
rebuild its air strength for they lacked the resources and the time.  Only four months later 
American forces landed at Leyte in the Philippines. 
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The Yamato and Musashi at Truk in  
1943. These two battleships formed  
the core of the Japanese forces  





“What man can say that there  
is no chance for our fleet to turn  
the tide of war in a decisive battle?” 







Given the complete failure of their carrier arm at Philippine Sea, the Japanese Navy 
devised a daring and complicated plan for the defense of the Philippines that almost 
worked.  This plan, called Sho-1, used the remaining Japanese carriers as bait so that two 
separate battleship forces could sail through the Philippine archipelago and crush the 
American landing forces at Leyte Gulf1. 
 The American landings on Leyte on 20 October, 1944, were covered by an 
armada mightier then even the one that supported the assault on the Marianas in June.  
This force was split into two fleets, the Third and Seventh.  Seventh Fleet, commanded 
by Vice Admiral Kinkaid, directly transported and supported General MacArthur’s troops 
on Leyte, and contained six battleships, four heavy cruisers (including one Australian), 
four light cruisers, eighteen escort carriers, and 48 destroyers and destroyer escorts.  
Seventh Fleet consisted of two main task forces, the bombardment force, commanded by 
Vice Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, and the escort carrier group, commanded by Rear Admiral 
Thomas Sprague. 
 Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral ‘Bull’ Halsey, was the renamed Fifth Fleet, 
which changed designations when Halsey switched commands with Admiral Spruance 
after the successful occupation of the Marianas.  Third Fleet’s carrier force, Task Force 
38 (renamed from Task Force 58), contained eight fleet and another eight light carriers, 
six battleships, five heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, 57 destroyers, and carried over 
1000 aircraft2. 
 The bait force for Halsey’s carriers was puny by comparison.  Commanded by 
Admiral Ozawa, this force was centered around the last Pearl Harbor veteran, Zuikaku, 
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along with three light carriers, two battleship/carrier conversions, eleven other escorts, 
and only carried a mere 118 aircraft. 
However, all Japanese hopes were pinned on the main battle force, Force A, 
which was to sail through the San Bernardino Strait and attack the American landing 
forces from the north.  Despite its lack of air cover, Force A contained a mighty array of 
surface vessels.  Centered around the leviathans Yamato and Musashi, this force also 
sailed with the battleship Nagato, the battlecruisers Kongo and Haruna, eight of Japan’s 
most powerful heavy cruisers, two other light cruisers, and fifteen destroyers.  Vice 
Admiral Takeo Kurita commanded Force A. 
 Supporting Force A was two smaller forces that were to sail through the Surigao 
Strait and attack the landings from the south.  One task force, Force C, contained two 
battleships, a cruiser/tender conversion, and four destroyers, while the second task force, 
2nd Striking Force, contained two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and four more 
destroyers.  Vice Admirals Shodi Nishimura and Kiyohide Shima commanded these 
forces respectively3.  However, Nishimura and Shima were personally very incompatible, 
and with Shima operating under very poor orders and intelligence, these two forces 
would have an extremely difficult time completing their mission4. 
 
Game 1: Historical scenario 
United States player: Gordon Cromley  
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
 
Turn 1: 24 October 1944, 0000 – 0400 
 American and Japanese forces prepared for air operations while the Japanese 
surface forces proceeded eastward. 
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Turn 2: 24 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 Search planes on both sides located opposing task forces, and the Japanese 
launched a strike against Task Group 38.3.  The strike managed to hit the carrier Essex 
and the light carrier Princeton, but lost over 80 planes while shooting down roughly a 
squadron of American CAP. 
Turn 3: 24 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 American carriers and Japanese land based air units both prepared strikes against 
each other’s forces. 
Turn 4: 24 October 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 A Japanese strike against Task Group 38.4 hit the carrier Franklin and shot down 
twenty American fighters, but lost over 100 planes in the action.  Meanwhile, a strike 
against Kurita’s fleet hit the battleship Yamato and seriously damaged the Musashi.  In 
return the Japanese only shot down about 20 planes. 
Turn 5: 24 October 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 Another Japanese strike on Task Group 38.4 seriously damaged the carrier 
Franklin, but 90 planes did not return to base.  A second strike against Kurita’s force 
sank the Musashi while losing less then ten planes. 
Turn 6: 24 October 1944, 2000 – 0000 
 While air actions died down due to nightfall, Admiral Nishimura’s force was 
surprised and engaged by the American Seventh Fleet’s bombardment forces in the 
Surigao Strait.  All Japanese ships were destroyed in the engagement while Nishimura 
only sank three American destroyers in return.  Also the light cruiser Phoenix was 
damaged by friendly torpedoes. 
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Turn 7: 25 October 1944, 0000 – 0400 
 Both sides again prepared for further air operations in the morning while Task 
Force 38 sailed north to locate and engage the Japanese carrier force.  Kurita’s battleship 
force also passed through the San Bernardino strait and turned south. 
Turn 8: 25 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 Another Japanese strike on Task Group 38.4 resulted in no further damage to the 
American vessels and about 40 Japanese planes shot down.  Kamikazes also struck 
against the transport force at Leyte, but only succeeded in hitting one transport.  But after 
search planes located Kurita’s task force the American escort carriers launched a strike, 
which hit the cruisers Chikuma, Myoko, and Haguro while losing roughly 20 planes. 
 In the meantime Task Force 38 attacked Ozawa’s carrier force, losing about 20 
planes to Japanese fighters and AA, but shooting down a dozen of the Japanese fighters.  
American bombers proceeded to sink the carrier Zuikaku, and the light carriers Chitose 
and Zuiho, while hitting the Chiyoda. 
Turn 9: 25 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 After withstanding the damage from the American escort carriers’ aircraft, 
Admiral Kurita turned around and sailed back through the San Bernardino Strait.  A 
second American strike against Ozawa lost a dozen planes but seriously damaged the 
light carrier Chiyoda and the battleship conversion Hyuga while slightly damaging the 
Ise.  Task Force 38 then turned back south to return to defending the landings at Leyte 
while all surviving Japanese forces sailed out of the area and broke contact. 
LOSSES:  The Americans suffered the loss of about 120 aircraft as well as three 
destroyers sunk and only one carrier significantly damaged.  The Japanese lost over 300 
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planes (mostly land based air) with three carriers, three battleships, a cruiser, and four 
destroyers sunk.  A light carrier and a battleship hybrid were heavily damaged, and 
another battleship hybrid, a battleship, and three cruisers were also slightly damaged.  
Although the airplane losses were relatively inconsequential for both sides, the Japanese 
Navy was soundly defeated and inflicted little damage in return. 
 
 In reality, the Battle of Leyte Gulf was actually a combination of four separate 
battles over two days.  First came the Battle of Sibuyan Sea on 24 October, in which 
aircraft from Task Groups 38.2 and 38.4 attacked Kurita’s A Force, sinking the Musashi.  
Kurita turned around and headed back west late in the day, tricking Halsey into thinking 
he was vanquished, and so the Americans turned their carriers north to attack Ozawa’s 
carrier fleet that was finally located late in the day. 
 That night came the Battle of Surigao Strait, in which Oldendorf’s bombardment 
forces crushed Nishimura’s C Force.  Shima’s 2nd Striking Force came into the Strait in 
the wake of the battle, and finding the devastation of Nishimura’s forces, turned around 
and headed for port. 
 In the morning of the 25th, Kurita passed through the San Bernardino Strait after 
turning around and heading east again late the previous day.  Heading south along the 
island of Samar, Kurita ran into the American escort carriers, which were totally 
unprepared to deal with the Japanese battleships.  In a defense that can only be called 
courageous, the escort carriers put up such a vicious fight that Kurita was scared off.  In 
the mean time, Task Force 38 attacked Ozawa’s carriers to the north, sinking all four of 
them.  Responding to desperate calls for help from the escort carriers, Halsey then turned 
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south in hopes of catching Kurita, but was too late.  Force A had already slipped back 
through the San Bernardino Strait and was heading home.  The first Kamikaze attacks 
struck the escort carriers soon after Kurita fled.  The escort carrier St. Lo was hit and 
sunk, and the Kamikaze attacks damaged several other escort carriers as well5. 
 In the real battle, the Americans lost the light carrier Princeton, two escort 
carriers, a destroyer and two destroyer escorts, more then was lost in the historical 
scenario.  The differences in losses resulted from two different reasons.  First, due to 
limitations in the game system, the Battle of Samar was not fought, and secondly, 
Japanese attacks against the Princeton and the Kamikaze strikes suffered from poor die 
rolls. 
 Historically, the Japanese lost many more ships including one heavy and three 
light carriers, three battleships, four heavy and four light cruisers, and eleven destroyers.  
American submarines also sank two more heavy cruisers before the start time of the 
game.  However, the differences in losses are almost exactly made up from the Battle of 
Samar6.  Although the American player’s escort carriers did attack Kurita’s force after 
the Japanese passed through the San Bernardino Strait, the planes did not perform as well 
as they did historically.  In summary, the historical scenario roughly matched the 
movements and losses of the real battle. 
 
Game 2: Maximum variant scenario #1 (Rule 2d10) 
United States player: Mark Gribbell  
Japanese player: Gordon Cromley 
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Turn 1: 24 October 1944, 0000 – 0400 
 As both sides prepared their air units for operations, Task Force 38 moved south 
to remain out of range of Formosa while Kurita’s Force A moved north to join with 
Ozawa’s carriers. 
Turn 2: 24 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 Both Japanese and American scouts located opposing fleets, but neither side made 
any strikes. 
Turn 3: 24 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 While some scouts managed to keep contact with opposing fleets, there were no 
attacks. 
Turn 4: 24 October 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 American scouts managed to locate Kurita’s force and a strike followed.  While 
the Japanese only shot down a dozen planes, American bombers sank the battleship 
Musashi, the cruiser Suzaya, and severely damaged the cruiser Kumano. 
 A second American strike attacked Nishimura’s C Force.  The strike and a 
Japanese CAP both lost less then ten planes, and American bombers sank the cruiser 
Ashigara and seriously damaged the cruiser Nachi. 
Turn 5: 24 October 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 Kurita’s task force moved out of range of further American attacks, but no further 
strikes were made. 
Turn 6: 24 October 1944, 2000 – 0000 
 Very little occurred as American forces regrouped and Kurita and Ozawa’s forces 
continued to sail towards the northern Philippines to link up. 
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Turn 7: 25 October 1944, 0000 – 0400 
 Scouts launched from the light carrier Independence located Nishimura and 
Shima’s fleets, confirming they were still in the Sibuyan Sea. 
Turn 8: 25 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 After linking up, Kurita and Ozawa’s fleet was found by American scouts.  Task 
Force 38 proceeded to launch a massive strike against the fleet, and expecting the 
American attack, the Japanese launched as many fighters into the air (from both the 
carriers and from land bases) as CAP. 
 About 160 Japanese fighters confronted over 400 American aircraft in what 
would surely be one of the largest naval/air battles in history.  Although outnumbered, 
American escort fighters held off the Japanese CAP, shooting down nearly 60 fighters 
while losing less then ten themselves.  American bombers lost about 40 planes to AA 
fire, but seriously damaged the battleship Yamato and light carrier Chitose, and sank the 
carriers Shinano, Zuikaku, and Chiyoda.  Over 100 Japanese bombers onboard the three 
sunken carriers also went down with their ships. 
 A second, smaller, strike also attacked Nishimura and Shima’s forces, seriously 
damaging the cruiser Mogami. 
Turn 9: 25 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
 Shattered by the American attack, Kurita and Ozawa’s forces began a retreat to 
the north to return to Japan.  Meanwhile, confident that Japanese airpower had been 
seriously mauled, the Third Fleet formed Task Force 34 to deal with Nishimura and 
Shima’s fleets. 
Turn 10: 25 October 1944, 1200 – 1600 
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 Task Force 34 engaged the Japanese C and 2nd Striking Forces.  In the short, but 
bitter conflict, American forces sank all of Nishimura and Shima’s forces (the battleships 
Fuso and Yamashiro, the heavy cruisers Nachi and Ashigara, the light cruiser Abakuma, 
and eight destroyers) while losing the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City and receiving serious 
damaged to the Salt Lake City’s sister, the Pensacola, and light damage to the light 
cruiser Miami.  With all remaining Japanese forces rapidly fleeing the area, the Battle of 
Leyte Gulf ended. 
LOSSES: Air losses were relatively light on both sides, with the Americans and Japanese 
both suffering 70 planes lost, but the Imperial Navy lost another 100 aircraft on their 
sunken aircraft carriers.  The US Navy lost only a heavy cruiser, and suffered damage on 
two other cruisers, while the Japanese lost three carriers, three battleships, four heavy and 
one light cruiser, and eight destroyers.  Further damage on the Japanese fleet was also 
inflicted on a heavy cruiser, a battleship, and a light carrier.  With a nineteen to one ship 
sink ratio, the Americans easily won the Battle of Leyte Gulf. 
 
 Attempting a new strategy, the Japanese player endeavored to link up his two 
most powerful forces in an effort to lure Task Force 38 north so that a combined land 
based air, carrier, and battleship forces could attack the main American battle fleet at one 
time.  However, the American fleet managed to launch a massive strike at maximum 
range against this combined Japanese force while staying out of range of Formosa and 
eliminate the main striking power of the Japanese Navy.  Also, an attempt to lure the 
American forces northward would be doomed to failure, for the American fleet’s 
objective was to cover the landings at Leyte Gulf, not chase around the Japanese fleet 
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(although this strategy may have worked against Halsey).  Another point is that the two 
combined forces did not enhance the Japanese AA protection, for only a limited number 
of ships can be arranged to protect a specific vessel.  Finally, combining the two powerful 
Japanese fleets actually helped the Americans, as it gave the US Navy only one single 
powerful task force to worry about instead of two, and this force remained far away from 
the landing zone, posing no threat to the American invasion. 
 
Game 3: Maximum variant scenario #2 (Rule 2d10) 
United States player: Gordon Cromley 
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
Turns 1 – 7: 0000 24 October – 0400 25 October 1944 
 The first day of the Battle of Leyte Gulf involved much maneuvering with both 
fleets, as Task Force 38 stayed out of range of Formosa and Kurita, Nishimura, and 
Shima’s fleets liked up west of the Philippines.  A Japanese strike on Task Groups 38.3 
and 38.4 in the midday lost nearly 70 planes and only managed to hit the light carrier 
Princeton, which was repaired overnight. 
Turn 8: 25 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 After scouts located fleets on both sides, two large strikes from land bases 
attacked Task Groups 38.3 and 38.4.  The Americans lost about fifteen fighters from their 
CAP, but shot down almost 120 Japanese planes.  Japanese torpedoes and bombs still 
proved deadly, as the light carrier Belleau Wood was hit, the fleet carrier Lexington (II) 
seriously damaged, and the light carrier Langley (II) sunk with 40 planes onboard. 
Turn 9: 25 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
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 American carrier bombers responded well, striking against the combined A, C, 
and 2nd Striking Forces sailing through the Sibuyan Sea.  In two large strikes, the 
Americans lost about 40 planes, but sank the heavy cruisers Mogami and Haguro, the 
battlecruisers Kongo, and Haruna, and the battleship Yamato.  Further, severe damage 
was inflicted to the light cruiser Abakuma and battleship Musashi. 
Turn 10: 25 October 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 Another Japanese strike from land bases zeroed in on Task Groups 38.2 and 77.2.  
American fighters and slow battleships put up a terrific air defense, shooting down nearly 
170 planes, while Japanese bombers managed to only slightly damage the carrier 
Intrepid. 
Turn 11: 25 October 1944, 1600 – 2000 
 After passing through the San Bernardino Strait, the A, C, and 2nd Striking Forces 
were again attacked by American carrier planes in a devastating strike.  The Americans 
lost only 20 aircraft while sinking the battleships Musashi, Nagato, Fuso, and Yamashiro, 
and damaging the heavy cruisers Nachi and Ashigara. 
 After surviving the air attacks, the Japanese then ran into the screen forces of 
Task Groups 38.3 and 38.4.  Realizing they were outnumbered, the Japanese quickly 
turned to flee, but lost the damaged cruisers Ashigara, Nachi, and Abakuma, as well as 
the light cruisers Yahagi and Noshiro in the retreat. 
Turn 12: 25 October 1944, 2000 – 0000 
 The carrier Intrepid completed repairs and American forces continued to coalesce 
around Leyte. 
Turn 13: 26 October 1944, 0000 – 0400 
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 Going for the Banzai attack, the remaining ships of the A, C, and 2nd Striking 
Forces sailed in a long arc to the east and then to the south west in an attempt to circle 
around the American fleet and attack the transports. 
Turn 14: 26 October 1944, 0400 – 0800 
 The Japanese launched another strike against Task Groups 38.3 and 38.4, 
shooting down less then ten American fighters and losing 70 aircraft in return.  However, 
the strike managed to hit the light carrier Princeton and sink the fleet carrier Lexington 
(II), which went down with 25 planes onboard. 
 In return American bombers attacked the A, C, and 2nd Striking Forces, losing a 
dozen planes, but sinking the heavy cruisers Chikuma, Myoko, and Suzaya.  The heavy 
cruisers Tone and Kumano were also seriously damaged. 
 Another American strike attacked Ozawa’s carrier force, sinking the light carrier 
Chitose, hitting the carrier Zuikaku, and severely damaging the carrier Shinano, while 
losing a dozen planes to AA fire. 
 The A, C, and 2nd Striking Forces managed to reach the landing zones, but were 
engaged by the screen of Task Group 38.1.  In the vicious surface battle that followed, 
the Japanese sank the heavy cruisers Chester and Pensacola and six destroyers with 
torpedoes, along with eight more destroyers and the light cruiser San Diego by gunfire.  
In return, the Japanese lost thirteen destroyers and the heavy cruisers Tone and Kumano.  
The cruiser Chokai managed to get within range to fire at some LSTs, but did not score 
any significant hits. 
Turn 15: 26 October 1944, 0800 – 1200 
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 Attempting to leave the area after the American transports successfully survived 
their attack, the remains of the A, C, and 2nd Striking Forces sailed into Surigao Strait, 
and were attacked by bombers from the American escort carriers.  After losing two 
destroyers, the Japanese were intercepted by Task Group 77.3, and in a short surface 
action, lost the heavy cruiser Chokai and six destroyers, completely eliminating the entire 
A, C, and 2nd Striking Forces.  Only the heavy cruiser Shropshire was slightly damaged 
by Japanese gunfire in return. 
Turn 16: 26 October 1944, 1200 – 1600 
 One final strike against Task Groups 38.3 and 38.4 hit the light carrier Princeton 
and shot down a dozen American fighters, but lost about 60 planes in return.  An 
American strike against the Japanese carriers shot down over 30 Japanese fighters while 
losing only 20 planes in return, but sank the carrier Shinano and seriously damaged the 
carriers Zuikaku and Chiyoda.  A small second strike against the carriers proceeded to 
shoot down a dozen Japanese fighters, but lost a dozen planes in return.  However, the 
Americans managed to put a few more torpedoes into the Zuikaku, sinking her.  The 
remaining Japanese ships managed to break contact during the night, ending the battle. 
LOSSES: The Japanese lost over 460 aircraft while the Americans lost only 130 planes 
with another 65 planes sunk with their carriers.  American ships losses numbered a fleet 
and a light carrier, two heavy and a light cruiser, and fourteen destroyers.  The Japanese 
suffered far worse, losing two heavy and a light carrier, seven battleships, ten heavy and 
three light cruisers, and 23 destroyers. 
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 Although the Japanese managed to sink a fleet carrier and attack the transports, 
they also sacrificed their fleet to do so.  American losses could be easily replaced, but the 
Japanese Navy could never hope to replace theirs.  This scenario does shed light on how 
powerful aircraft carriers can be, for in two turns the US carriers sank seven battleships, a 
force that took Japan nearly thirty years to build, while holding off enemy air strikes with 
relative success and defending the landings.  Although the landings were disrupted by the 
shattered remains of the Japanese A, C, and 2nd Striking forces, they would easily be able 
to begin landing their supplies within a day (and probably in considerable less time), and 
Army troops would be in no real danger of running out of supplies. 
 The skilled Japanese pilots proved more effective then in past scenarios, but 
mainly because of their tremendous numbers of torpedo bombers.  Overall, the skilled 
Japanese pilots did not make a big difference in the results of Leyte Gulf, and, as 
mentioned earlier, the American casualties could be easily replaced. 
 A major helping factor for the American fleet that is not readily apparent in all 
three scenarios is the escort carriers.  One must keep in mind that while Task Force 38 
was busy striking against the Japanese fleet, the escort carriers of Task Group 77.4 was 
keeping an average of over 100 fighters as CAP over the landings at all times, effectively 
eliminating the possibility of a successful Japanese air attack.  True unsung heroes, the 
escort carriers give incredible flexibility to the main American battle fleet because the big 
carriers don’t have to directly protect the landings, allowing them the ability to smash the 
Japanese Navy.  Although tasked with less glamorous, but no less important duties, the 
escort carriers are a key component of the American success in the Pacific. 
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 Another result of play testing is the realization that the battleships are the primary 
protagonists of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, not the aircraft carriers.  This is because the 
Japanese carrier force is so puny in comparison to the Americans (even when the full air 
groups and the Shinano are added) that they can only be used as a distraction, and the 
battleships must be used as the main weapon. 
 But sinking the Japanese battleships was no easy feat.  Often in the games, as well 
as historically, only the battleship Musashi was sunk before the Japanese sail through the 
San Bernardino strait.  Once the Japanese are through the strait, it becomes more difficult 
for the American carriers to deal with the battleships, for at that point the amount of time 
it would take to ready a strike is also about the same amount of time it would take for the 
Japanese to reach the American transports.  As a result, the most efficient way of dealing 
with Japanese fleet is for the Americans to engage them in surface combat with their own 
battleships.  In this situation the battleships, even the older, slower ones, become 
extremely useful. 
However, the constant presence of the American carriers disrupts the ability to 
test just how damaging the Japanese surface forces could have been at the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf.  Given the fact that any knowledgeable American player would never allow the San 
Bernardino strait to go unprotected as in the real war, it is impossible and inefficient to 
effectively test out the different surface action possibilities when playing the full game.  
Therefore, four surface battles were played to explore the potential actions and results of 
various combinations of Japanese and American surface groups while temporarily taking 
Task Force 38 out of the picture. 
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 To start, the first surface possibility is what if Nishimura and Shima made it 
through the Surigao Strait unhindered and reached the landing zones in the morning of 25 
October?  It is likely that Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf’s bombardment force (Task 
Group 77.2 and 77.3, which historically wrecked Nishimura’s fleet in the Battle of 
Surigao Strait) would be near the transports and could form up to engage Nishimura and 
Shima’s fleets. 
Surface Action #1: Nishimura & Shima vs. Oldendorf and transports 
United States player: Mark Gribbell 
Japanese player: Dr. Joe Guilmartin 
 Putting up a spirited fight despite being heavily outgunned, the Japanese managed 
to sink eleven destroyers and slightly damage four battleships (the West Virginia, 
Maryland, California, and Tennessee).  All Japanese ships in both Nishimura and 
Shima’s Task Forces were sunk in action. 
 
 Despite not being surprised (as in the real war at Surigao Strait) as well as linking 
up with Shima’s fleet, Nishimura’s force was still soundly defeated by Oldendorf’s fleet.  
It is doubtful that under any circumstances, Nishimura could have changed the outcome 
of the battle, given the fact that his battleships were outnumbered three to one and his 
escorts even more so. 
 A more balanced and exciting battle, and one that almost happened, is that 
between Kurita’s A Force and Vice Admiral Lee’s Task Force 34.  The surface 
component of Task Force 38, Task Force 34 was to be detached as an independent fleet 
in case the need or opportunity of directly attacking Japanese surface forces arose.  
Admiral Halsey could and should have detached Task Force 34 to cover the San 
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Bernardino strait before sailing north to attack the Japanese carriers on 25 October.  
Instead, Lee’s force went with the carriers and missed out on an opportunity to confront 
Kurita in not just what was the only time the two most powerful battleships ever built, the 
Yamato and Iowa, could have faced off, but also what might have been the most dramatic 
and decisive large-scale surface battle since Trafalgar. 
Surface Action #2: Kurita vs. Lee 
United States player: Gordon Cromley 
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
 Both forces arrayed their fleets in three separate battle lines, the first with 
destroyers, the second with cruisers, and the third with capital ships.  In the ensuing 
melee, three distinct phases resulted: the torpedo attacks, the battle line slug out, and the 
Japanese retreat. 
 To start the battle, the Japanese quickly fired their torpedoes in the destroyer line, 
then after some skillful maneuvering fired the torpedoes from their cruiser line.  The two 
torpedo barrages coupled with gunfire sank eighteen American destroyers, the light 
cruisers Vincennes (II), and Miami, as well as the heavy cruiser New Orleans.  The light 
cruiser Biloxi was also damaged.  With the Japanese remaining out of range of the 
American torpedoes, Lee’s ships responded solely with gunfire, successfully sinking the 
heavy cruisers Haguro, Myoko, and Chikuma, the light cruiser Yahagi, and two 
destroyers.  After the torpedo attacks, the two main battle lines managed to get within 
range of each other, and the Yamato open fired on the Iowa, but missed with her first 
barrage. 
 The American battleships quickly responded, and while the two main lines sailed 
parallel and exchanged fire, the US battlewagons concentrated on the Yamato and gained 
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a clear upper hand.  By the time the Yamato finally sank under a deluge of 16” shells, the 
Japanese had also lost the heavy cruiser Suzaya and five destroyers, while the Americans 
only lost the light cruiser Santa Fe.  Realizing the battle was lost, the surviving Japanese 
forces turned to retreat. 
 Unfortunately for the Japanese, none of their ships could escape the speed or guns 
of the Iowa and New Jersey.  The American battleships did an efficient job of mopping 
up the remaining Japanese vessels, sinking the battleship Nagato, the battlecruisers 
Kongo and Haruna, the heavy cruisers Chokai, Kumano, and Tone, the light cruiser 
Noshiro, and eight destroyers.  In return, the Japanese managed to sink the heavy cruiser 
Wichita, the light cruiser Mobile, and seriously damaged the battleship Alabama. 
LOSSES: The Japanese lost all of their ships, two battleships, two battlecruisers, five 
heavy and two light cruisers, and fifteen destroyers, while the Americans lost two heavy 
and four light cruisers, and eighteen destroyers, and suffered severe damage to another 
light cruiser and a battleship. 
 
 Although putting up a terrific fight, the American battleships again overwhelmed 
the Japanese.  Like with Nishimura and Shima, it is doubtful that the Japanese could have 
changed the outcome of this battle either.  The Japanese could have held their deadly 
torpedoes back to directly attack the American battleships, but it is likely that the 
destroyers and cruisers would either be sunk or severely damaged by American gunfire 
before the Japanese could have reached a position to fire at the battleships. 
 But what if Nishimura, Shima, and Kurita managed to reach the landing zone?  In 
the third scenario it is assumed that Kurita charged into the gulf and through the escort 
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carriers (a battle which will be played out later) after taking the same losses that he did 
historically (three cruisers sunk, another damaged), and linked up with Nishimura and 
Shima’s forces, successfully executing the Japanese plan.  At the landings Oldendorf 
again defended the transports, but would be outnumbered this time. 
 
Surface Action #3: Kurita, Nishimura, & Shima vs. Oldendorf & transports 
United States player: Gordon Cromley 
Japanese player: Mark Gribbell 
 Similar to Surface Action #2, the Japanese quickly launched their torpedoes from 
both their destroyer and cruiser lines, which proved devastating to the American forces.  
The heavy cruisers Portland and Shropshire along with 20 destroyers were sunk, but the 
Japanese lost the light cruiser Noshiro and nine destroyers in return.  Meanwhile the 
Yamato and two battlecruisers hooked around the American lines to directly attack the 
transports.  Before the vulnerable US ships could break off, the Japanese sank 24 LSTs 
and six transports, along with the battleships West Virginia and Pennsylvania, the light 
cruiser Denver, and eight destroyers.  However, the Americans managed to sink the 
battleship Fuso, the cruiser Mogami, and the light cruisers Yahagi and Abakuma. 
 Once the transports escaped the action, the Japanese turned to deal with the 
remaining American forces.  Before the battle ended, the US lost the battleships 
California, Tennessee, and Mississippi, and the heavy cruisers Louisville and 
Minneapolis.  In response the Americans managed to sink the battleships Yamashiro and 
Nagato, and eight destroyers. 
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LOSSES: The Americans lost five battleships, five cruisers, 28 destroyers, six transports, 
and 24 LSTs while the Japanese lost three battleships, four cruisers, and seventeen 
destroyers. 
 
 For the first time in this entire thesis, the Japanese forces outnumbered the 
Americans.  The Japanese used their advantages well, holding off the Americans with 
their own slower battleships while sailing straight for the transports with their faster 
capital ships.  With the loss of some transports and most of their LSTs, the American 
landings were severely disrupted, but it is likely that the remaining transports would still 
be able to unload their cargo, just not for some time.  Oldendorf’s force fought 
competently, but was unable to stop the Japanese.  However, given the time that it would 
take for the Japanese to complete this action, the surviving ships would be met with 
overwhelming air power from Task Force 38, which would almost certainly sink most, if 
not all, of the Japanese survivors, turning the victory into a Pyrrhic one. 
 Although the Japanese won a clear victory, there are a few variables that were not 
accounted for in the battle.  First off, the surviving American escort carriers would be 
launching strikes against the Japanese fleet throughout the battle, and even though the 
escort carriers did not carry the necessary ordinance to seriously damaged the Japanese 
battleships, the planes could damage the smaller vessels, much as they did historically 
with the cruisers Chokai, Suzaya, Chikuma, and Kumano during the Battle of Samar. 
 Secondly, American gunnery radar was not represented.  The battleships West 
Virginia, California, and Tennessee were equipped with the latest gunnery radar, and at 
the Battle of Surigao Strait, open fired at a range of 22,800 yards, an incredible feat for a 
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night action7.  During the Battle of Samar, the Japanese engaged the American escort 
carriers usually at a range of less then ten nautical miles (about 20,000 yards), but were 
only able to sink a single escort carrier. 
However, the Battle of Samar is not entirely indicative of the Japanese accuracy 
for two reasons.  First, Admiral Kurita believed that he was engaging the whole of Task 
Force 38, and so had the sights on his guns aimed to shoot at fleet carriers, not the much 
smaller escort carriers, which threw off the aim.  Secondly, the Japanese also used armor 
piercing shells during the battle, which would pass right through the small hulls of the 
escort carriers, making a true determination of hits scored nearly impossible.  Even so, it 
is reasonable to believe that the American battleship fire would be generally more 
accurate then the Japanese, but, that may not have stopped Kurita’s fleet from sinking 
many of the transports. 
 But what if Kurita managed to make it to the transports without Oldendorf 
protecting them?  In this final action it is given that the Battle of Surigao Strait proceeded 
as it did historically, so Nishimura and Shima could not join up with Kurita.  Historically 
Oldendorf would have been able to intercept Kurita before the Japanese reached the 
landing area8, but testing what would happen if Oldendorf were unable to do so proved 
interesting. 
Surface Action #4: Kurita vs. Escort carriers, transports, and then Oldendorf 
United States player: Mark Gribbell 
Japanese player: Gordon Cromley 
 After spotting Kurita’s attack force, the American escort carriers launched a 
strike, which slightly damaged the cruisers Kumano and Tone, heavily damaged the 
cruisers Suzaya and Haguro, and sank two destroyers.  In the ensuing surface action, the 
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Americans sacrificed their destroyers and destroyer escorts in a desperate attempt to 
allow their escort carriers to break off.  Despite losing the ten destroyer escorts and three 
destroyers, the Americans still lost six escort carriers to the Japanese warships.  The only 
Japanese loss was the light cruiser Yahagi, which, almost comically, came too close to 
the escort carriers and was sunk by their AA guns. 
 Once the escort carriers were swept out the way, the Japanese proceeded to the 
landing zones to attack the transports, but not before another strike from the escort 
carriers came in.  The cruisers Kumano, Chikuma, and Suzaya were hit, while the Myoko 
was severely damaged, and three destroyers sunk. 
 When they reached the transports, the Japanese eliminated the few defenders of 
the transports (four destroyers, which took an incredible amount of punishment before 
sinking), and proceeded with their own turkey shoot.  33 LSTs and 21 transports were 
destroyed before the carnage ended (only three transports survived), and, with their 
mission complete, the Japanese proceeded south to leave the area. 
 However Oldendorf’s bombardment force finally intercepted Kurita’s fleet before 
they could escape.  With their cruisers damaged, their battleships outnumbered, and 
possessing a greater speed then the American battleships, the Japanese quickly tried to 
outmaneuver the enemy fleet and continue on their journey.  In the ensuing running 
battle, the Japanese sank 23 destroyers, inflicted light damage to the light cruiser 
Columbia and battleship Pennsylvania, and left the light cruiser Denver dead in the 
water.  In return the Americans sank five destroyers, four heavy cruisers (the Haguro, 
Kumano, Suzaya, and Myoko), the battleship Nagato, and, after a lucky hit in her engine 
spaces, the battlecruiser Haruna. 
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LOSSES: The Americans lost ten destroyer escorts, thirty destroyers, six escort carriers, 
and, most importantly, 21 transports and 33 LSTs.  The Japanese lost a battleship, a 
battlecruiser, four heavy and one light cruiser, and ten destroyers, but Kurita succeeded 
enormously in his mission to sink the American landing forces at Leyte. 
 
 One single result stands out from this play testing.  Even with the loss of the 
Musashi and, historically, most of his heavy cruisers, Kurita was still more then capable 
of completely annihilating the American landing force at Leyte.  With the loss of almost 
all of their transports, the troops on Leyte would be cut off from supplies until the next 
convoy would arrive on 29 October (Task Group 78.8)9. 
 How would the Army troops fare in the meantime?  Although cut from supplies, 
the American troops would probably still be able to hold out on Leyte.  Essential supplies 
may have been able to be flown into Tacloban airfield and the Third and Seventh fleets 
would still be able to offer massive fire support.  On the flip side, the Japanese on Leyte 
would be unprepared to launch a large offensive to drive the Americans off the island, 
and would have little time to plan for such an operation.  Usually when the Japanese 
planned hasty operations the results would often turn out worse then if they had properly 
prepared for an attack10.  Overall, American Army operations in the Philippines would 
probably be set back a month or two.  However, it is unlikely that Navy led invasions in 
1945 (Iwo Jima and Okinawa) would be affected.  This battle also would not affect the 
progress on the Atom bomb, which would still be designed, tested, used, and have ended 
the war at the same time. 
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 But Oldendorf waiting for Kurita would make this possibility moot.  The results 
of a battle between Kurita and Oldendorf protecting the transports would probably be a 
mix of the third and fourth surface actions played.  The faster Japanese capital ships may 
be able to maneuver around Oldendorf and sink a few transports, but the American force 
would also be able to destroy much of Kurita’s force as well.  Also, by proceeding to the 
landing area Kurita would be staying in the area long enough for Task Force38 to return 
and launch a devastating strike against the Japanese fleet. 
 One can also partially extrapolate what may have happened if Nishimura and 
Shima’s forces managed to attack the landing zones unhindered (say, if Oldendorf was 
occupied with Kurita to the north).  Given the smaller size of their forces and the slower 
speed of their battleships, Nishimura and Shima probably would not destroy as much as 
Kurita, but the bulk of the transports and LSTs would most likely not survive.  Even a 
pair of Japan’s oldest battleships could smash the landings if given the chance. 
 What if the Musashi was present in these battles with Kurita?  Against Task Force 
34, the results would only be slightly changed, with the Americans probably losing a few 
battleships, but the Musashi and the rest of Kurita’s force would still be sunk under the 
cascade of 16” shells.  But if the Musashi was available in the third surface battle, the 
Japanese may very well have not only destroyed the entire transport and LST force, but 
Oldendorf’s forces as well.  The addition of the Musashi may also have enabled the 
Japanese to actually fully engage Oldendorf in the fourth surface battle with a reasonable 
chance of success.  This highlights the importance of the Yamato battleships during the 
Battle of Leyte Gulf.  The Yamatos are the principal threat against the American forces 
by far.  Their extensive armor allowed the Yamato to hold off many attacks by 
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Oldendorf’s battleships without suffering any damage.  With the Yamatos the Japanese 
have a threat, without them the Imperial Navy is doomed. 
 But the result remains.  Given the proper circumstances, circumstances that Kurita 
almost found himself in, the Japanese could have crushed the American transport fleet at 
Leyte Gulf despite Japan’s lack of airpower.  Given that the historiography of World War 
II naval combat consistently states the supremacy of the aircraft carrier over the 
battleship, this result questions such a claim.  Are battleships truly obsolete?  Did the 
aircraft carrier really show its supremacy? 
                                                          
1 Hoyt, Edwin P., The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the death knell of the Japanese Fleet, Weybright and Talley, 
New York, 1972. 
2 Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII, 
Leyte, June 1944 – January 1945, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1958. 
3 Macintyre, Donald, Leyte Gulf, Armada in the Pacific, Ballentine’s Illustrated History of World War II, 
battle book no. 11, Ballentine Books Inc., New York, New York, 1969. 
4 Hoyt, The Battle of Leyte Gulf. 
5 Hoyt, The Battle of Leyte Gulf. 
6 Keegan, John, Ed., Atlas of the Second World War, Times Books, London, 1989. 
7 Bennett, Naval Battles of World War Two, 231. 
8 Bennett, Naval Battles of World War Two, 240. 
9 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II; Volume XII, Leyte, 417. 













The four Iowa class battleships  
sail in formation for the first and 
last time on 7 June 1954.  The  
Iowa is in the foreground, followed 
by the Wisconsin, Missouri, and  
New Jersey. 
 
“I went down and personally saw the  
Secretary of Defense (Melvin R. Laird)  
and was ordered from the White House  
that the ship (the USS New Jersey)  
should be deactivated because it was  
impending the peace negotiations (in Vietnam).” 




The list of ships lost in the Second World War is a long one, and the number of capital 
ships, by definition battleships, battlecruisers, and pocket battleships, sunk during the 
conflict is thirty-six.  Of these, nineteen were sunk by aircraft, which would seem to 
weigh heavily against the battleship, but an in-depth look proves revealing. 
 The entire list of capital ships sunk in World War II is as follows:  the battleships 
Bretange, Provence, Richeliu, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Royal Oak, Barham, Queen Elizabeth, 
Valiant, Prince of Wales, Littorio, Roma, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro, Mutsu, Yamato, 
Musashi, Marat, Oklahoma, Arizona, California, and West Virginia, the battlecruisers 
Scharnhorst, Repulse, Hood, Conti di Cavor, Caio Dulio, Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima, and 
Hiei, and the ‘pocket battleships’ Admiral Scheer, Lützow, and Admiral Graf Spee. 
Of these vessels, seventeen were sunk in harbor, the Bretange, Provence, 
Richeliu, Tirpitz, Royal Oak, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Littorio, Ise, Hyuga, Marat, 
Oklahoma, Arizona, California, West Virginia, Cavor, Caio Dulio, Haruna, Admiral 
Scheer, and Lützow, all by aircraft except the Bretange, Provence, Queen Elizabeth, 
Valiant, and Royal Oak.  However, the ships sunk in harbor should not be counted in 
comparing the battleship and aircraft totals given the fact that ten of these vessels served 
one function or another later in the war.  The Lützow was turned into a gun platform, and 
Russians crammed every AA gun they could onto the bottomed Marat.  The Provence, 
Richeliu, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Dulio, Littorio, California, and West Virginia were 
all salvaged and returned to service, although some served more notably then others.  Of 
the other ten ships, there are three connected reasons why they were not repaired.  Either 
the ship was too heavily damaged from capsizing or magazine explosions (the Bretange, 
Tirpitz, Oklahoma, and Arizona), too old to be considered worthwhile (the Royal Oak, 
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and again, the Bretange), or there was not enough resources or time before the war ended 
to repair the ship (the Ise, Hyuga, Haruna, Cavor, Admiral Scheer, and again, the 
Tirpitz).   
But attacking and sinking a ship in harbor is far easier and different then in a 
battle on the high seas.  Fifteen capital ships were sunk while at sea in World War II.  
Submarines sank two (the Barham and Kongo), while eight were sunk by or as the result 
of surface actions (the Graf Spee, Scharnhorst, Bismarck, Hood, Kirishima, Hiei, Fuso, 
and Yamashiro), and only five were sunk by air attack (the Repulse, Prince of Wales, 
Roma, Yamato, and Musashi).  Of the eight sunk by surface actions, only three were not 
sunk by enemy capital ships, the Graf Spee, Hiei, and Fuso.  The Graf Spee was scuttled 
after suffering damage by British cruisers of River Plate, and her Captain feared another 
engagement.  The Hiei was crippled by several American cruisers in a night battle during 
the First Battle of Guadalcanal and finished off by aircraft in the morning, but it is 
important to note that without the damage caused by the cruisers, the Hiei would never 
have been sunk in that battle.  Finally, the Fuso was sunk by numerous torpedo hits from 
American destroyers. 
The other five ships were sunk by direct capital ship gunfire.  The Yamashiro was 
sunk during the Battle of Surigao Strait under fire from destroyers, cruisers, and several 
battleships, and the battleship Washington sank the Kirishima at the Third Battle of 
Guadalcanal.  In the Atlantic, the British battleship Duke of York sunk the German 
battlecruiser Scharnhorst, and the German battleship Bismarck sunk the British 
battlecruiser Hood in a similar fashion to many battlecruisers lost at Jutland in 1916. 
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The Bismarck experienced an interesting fate.  After sinking the Hood, the entire 
Royal Navy attempted to hunt down the German dreadnought, but the Bismarck almost 
made it to France.  A last ditch attack by torpedo planes from the carrier Ark Royal 
disabled the battleship’s steering, allowing the British battleships Rodney and King 
George V, and the cruisers Dorsetshire and Norfolk to catch up and sink her after dozens 
of hits from 16”, 14” and 8” shells and several torpedoes.  Although aircraft disabled the 
Bismarck, the British surface ships delivered the final blow.  Also, a rough comparison of 
the amount of time that it would take for the Ark Royal’s aircraft to damage and sink the 
Bismarck to the British surface ships is revealing.  Estimating that one torpedo equals 
approximately two heavy shells (14” or 16”), that the Bismarck took roughly fifty hits 
from these heavy shells, that each strike of twelve torpedo planes from the would score 
three hits (a generous assumption), and that the Ark Royal would be able to launch two or 
three strikes a day, it would take three or four days and roughly eight strikes to sink the 
Bismarck, where it took the British capital ships less then four hours1.  It is also 
interesting to note that the American Essex, a carrier significantly larger then the Ark 
Royal, only carried 36 torpedoes in her magazines2.  Even if the Ark Royal carried the 
same number of torpedoes, it is likely that she would run out of them before her planes 
could sink the Bismarck. 
An analysis of the ships sunk by air attack proves even more interesting.  The 
Roma was sunk under rather exceptional circumstances, when a new German ‘Fritz – X’ 
radio controlled glide bomb started a fire that could not be put out before it reached a 
magazine.  Land-based G3M and G4M bombers carrying torpedoes sunk the Prince of 
Wales and Repulse, while only the Yamato and Musashi were actually sunk by carrier 
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aircraft, and the Yamato only because the Japanese gave the Americans a chance to sink 
her during the Okinawa campaign.  The Yamato and Musashi were also sunk by attack 
forces of hundreds of bombers, large enough to sink any ship, not just a battleship.  Also, 
given the fact that all five of these ships did not possess powerful and/or effective AA 
armaments do not make the triumph of the attacking aircraft impressive3.  An Iowa class 
battleship and Alaska class battlecruiser4 in place of the Prince of Wales and Repulse 
might have actually beaten off the Japanese bomber attacks.  It is also important to note 
that none of these five ships possessed any friendly fighter cover when they were sunk. A 
significant fighter CAP (Combat Air Patrol) over the Prince of Wales and Repulse, as 
well as the Roma, might have also allowed the three ships to survive.  However, as 
displayed numerous times in the games of Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, it is doubtful 
that even a large CAP over the Yamato and Musashi would allow them to endure the 
American air attacks.  In summary, with these five ships in mind the triumph of the 
airplane over the battleship is hollow.  The five capital ships in question neither had any 
effective fighter protection, nor did they have the ability to adequately protect themselves 
against their attacks.  Therefore, the most dangerous situation for a capital ship was a 
surface action, not an air attack. 
But the demise of the battleship goes beyond the losses of World War II.  There 
are many reasons for the disappearance of the battleship from the world’s oceans.  First, 
the raid on Pearl Harbor forced the US Navy’s leaders to rely on its aircraft carriers 
instead of its battleships, not necessarily because they wanted to, but because they had to.  
The raid thrust the aircraft carrier into a position of prominence, which was greatly 
enhanced at the Battle of Midway.  At Midway, a small American carrier force defeated 
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the largest fleet the Japanese ever assembled, and no number of Japanese battleships 
could change that fact. 
Moreover, due to a general unwillingness to utilize the vessels at hand, the Axis 
powers often did not deploy their battleships in situations in which they could make a 
serious difference.  This author does not believe that the Axis could have won the Second 
World War, but the use of their battleships in two different theaters could have vastly 
expanded the Allied casualty lists.  The first of these theaters is the Mediterranean in 
1940 and 1941 with the Italian Navy.  Their central position in the Mediterranean put a 
serious rift into the British Empire, and also allowed Italian land based air more 
flexibility then the British.  The Italians also had the most modern battle fleet in the world 
as of Mussolini’s declaration of war in 1940, with two new battleships and four 
battlecruisers modified within the previous five years.  Except for their lack of radar, the 
Italian capital ships vastly outclassed their British counterparts; the secondary armament 
on the Littorio battleships even outranged the main armament on the British battleship 
Warspite!5  However, the British did hold a major advantage in aircraft carriers, of which 
the Italians had none. However, a German commitment of Ju-87 ‘Stuka’ dive-bombers 
would be a great asset to the Italians.  Ju-87s did managed to seriously damage the carrier 
Illustrious at one point, but the Luftwaffe also continuously overstated their victories.   
The Germans claimed to have sunk the British carrier Ark Royal several times, and the 
Luftwaffe even claimed that they sunk the American carrier Wasp. 
The Italians seemed to be spooked into submission after the Battle of Calabria 
when the Warspite scored a hit on the Italian battlecruiser Giulio Cesare at long range6.  
Although the Italian Navy was also seriously damaged at the Battle of Cape Matapan and 
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the raid on Taranto, they still had a battleship and three battlecruisers available in mid 
1941.  Cooperation with the Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine could have put a serious strain 
on British resources.  If, in May 1941, the Italian Navy made a major foray, coupled with 
Rommel’s offensive in Africa, along with an attempted breakout of the Bismarck in the 
North Atlantic, it is unlikely that the British would have been able to stop any one of the 
attacks, much less all three. 
A second and perhaps even more critical theater where battleships could have 
greatly changed the outcome is Guadalcanal in late 1942 and early 1943.  The Japanese 
used their Kongo battlecruisers well, but remained unwilling to commit more powerful 
battleships, specifically the Yamato.  As mentioned earlier, the Yamato and Musashi were 
both sunk by hundreds of attacking planes, but the Allied forces would have been lucky if 
they could scrape up a total of one hundred planes in the entire southwest Pacific in late 
1942.  Although the Yamato could have been disabled by a few lucky torpedo hits, it is 
more likely that she could have survived numerous attacks and then pounded Henderson 
Field to bits while protecting Japanese transports landing troops on the island.  The only 
chance the Americans would have had to stop the Yamato would have been their own fast 
battleships, specifically, the North Carolina, Washington, and South Dakota.  The US 
Navy was not reluctant to risk its best battleships, and it paid off in the end.  Both the 
North Carolina and South Dakota played a major role in beating off air attacks against 
the carrier Enterprise in the Battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz respectively.  
Most prominently, the Washington practically delivered the final victory in the Third 
Battle of Guadalcanal all by herself when, at the critical moment, she surprised and 
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destroyed the Kirishima.  The willingness of the Americans to use everything they had at 
Guadalcanal, including their battleships, is a major reason why they won the campaign. 
Beyond Pearl Harbor and Midway, there were several more strikes against the 
battleship that cropped up after World War II.  With the destruction of the German and 
Japanese Navies, there were no other viable enemy naval forces in the world to contest 
the seas with the American Navy.  The Soviets only had three outdated battleships, which 
would be no match to the combined Royal and US Navies.  The expense of maintaining 
battleships also assisted in their deactivations.  Finally, the introduction of nuclear 
weapons and the belief that the next war would only be a nuclear war not only cut into 
the battleship, but into many other conventional weapons as well.  It was probably only 
President Truman’s personal penchant for the Missouri that allowed her to remain in 
service several years after World War II. 
This author does not advocate the idea that battleships are better then carriers, but 
rather that battleships still have a place in the Navy.  Just how well would the battleship 
do in the modern world?  With the demise of the Soviet Union, there are few remaining 
armor piercing weapons remaining in the world’s inventory available to sink a 
battleship7, and if the lessons of the Prince of Wales and Repulse were learned, any 
battleship with adequate air cover would be extremely difficult to sink.  Also, a battleship 
can carry as many missiles as any cruiser or destroyer, and has the additional advantage 
of their big guns.  A major difference between now and World War II is the advancement 
of the submarine, but torpedoes that sink enemy submarines can be dropped from 
helicopters operated off of battleships.  All in all, battleships have a better chance of 
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surviving and completing a difficult mission then any other ship, save perhaps 
submarines, but only when keeping in mind the latter’s stealth abilities. 
But the only battleships remaining in the world are the celebrated American Iowa 
class, consisting of the Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin, all now retired from 
service.  These four united speed, protection, and firepower in a unique combination that 
has continually demonstrated itself in the wars since World War II.  Time and again the 
Iowas have proven their efficiency and firepower in Korea, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf, 
yet keeping them in service has always been a challenge.  This is mainly due to the often 
absurd arguments made by congressmen during debates to reactivate the Iowas.  One 
Senator even stated that a completely unarmored cruiser “was ‘perhaps’ more survivable 
than the New Jersey”8. 
Even so, the Iowas were decommissioned and stricken from the Navy list.  
Fortunately these four battleships managed to survive the scrapper’s torch long enough to 
become museum ships9 and remain available in case the big guns of a battleship are 
needed once again.  “With the retirement of the last of this class in 1992, the era of the 
cannon-armed ship-of-the-line came to an end, after a run of nearly four centuries.  
Maybe.”10
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The carriers Saratoga, Enterprise,  
Hornet (II), and San Jacinto after  
the war.  These four ships represent 
the major carrier classes (except for  
the Wasp, which was sunk in 1942)  




















































































































































































NEW AND ENHANCED RULES FOR PHILIPPINE SEA AND LEYTE GULF 
 
11d4) During the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf scenarios, American repair rates are 
increased as follows: 
11d4.1) If a damaged American vessel remains stationary for two daylight turns, 
it may remove one hit point. 
11d4.2) If a damaged American vessel remains stationary for one night turn, it 
may remove one hit point. 
11d4.3) A damaged American air unit may remove one hit per night turn that it 
remains ‘on board’ or ‘on ground’. 
11d4.4) American vessels may remove a maximum of three hits every six turn 
period.  While using these rates there is no limit to the number of hits a 
unit can remove each game. 
11d4.5) All other rules of 11d still apply in conjunction with these repair rules 
(reminder: units can never unflip).  Japanese units still repair without these 
enhancements. 
 
11e4) During the Philippine Sea scenarios submarine attacks are conducted as follows: 
11e4.1) Only actual submarine units may attack.  They may attack at any time 
during the combat or air return phases.  Submarines may only attack 
discovered enemy task forces in the same hex as the submarine where 
exact information of the task force’s components have been determined.  
Submarines may only attack once per turn. 
11e4.2) The attacking player determines which specific ship unit in that task force 
is to be attacked, and both players role for combat as normal, with the 
following modifications taken into account: 
11e4.21) If the defending unit has an ‘a’ armor factor, the unit receives a minus 
three modification to its die role. 
 If the defending unit has a ‘b’, ‘c’, or ‘d’ armor factor, the unit’s defensive 
value is rebased to zero. 
 If the defending unit is a ‘DD’ or then the unit’s defense does not change 
at all from the printed value on the unit. 
 Submarines attack with the printed value on their unit.  They receive a 
plus three bonus if attacking at night, and a plus four bonus if attacking a 
‘dead in the water’ ship. 
11e4.3) Once a submarine’s attack has been resolved, the defensive player may 
then initiate ASW combat.  For every surviving individual destroyer in the 
defending task force, the defending player gets one die roll against the 
enemy submarine.  If the defensive die roll is five times or more then the 
submarine’s roll, then the submarine is sunk. 
11e4.3) There may be only one submarine per hex on the search board. 
 
20) MODIFIED ANTI-AIRCRAFT VALUES AND COMBAT 
20a) Japanese Anti-Aircraft values are modified during the Philippine Sea and 
Leyte Gulf scenarios as follows: 
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20a1) The battleship Yamato’s anti-aircraft value is increased to seven 
(7) to match her sister’s, the Musashi, value. 
20a2) If a Japanese anti-aircraft combat involves two or more ships with 
AA values greater then zero (0), and one or more of which is a 
battleship or aircraft carrier (BB, CV, or CVL), then that AA 
combat gets a bonus of plus one. 
20b) American anti-aircraft values are also modified during the Philippine Sea 
and Leyte Gulf scenarios as follows: 
20b1) All American battleships (BB) with a speed of ‘2’ on their front 
side have their AA values increased by three.  On their backside 
these same battleships have their AA values increased by two. 
20b2) All American cruisers (CA and CL) and destroyers (DD) that have 
an AA value of ‘1’ or ‘2’ on their front side have their AA values 
increased by one.  These ships retain this increase when flipped. 
20b3) The AA value of the carrier Enterprise is increased by one.  If the 
Enterprise is flipped, she looses the plus one modification. 
 20c) Modified American AA combats 
20c1) Radar guided AA defense:  For every AA combat that involves 
two or more American ships with AA values greater then zero, and 
involves one or more unflipped cruiser, battleship, or carrier (CL, 
CA, BB, CVL, or CV), that combat gains a plus one bonus to its 
AA value. 
20c2) Proximity Fuses:  All American battleships and carriers (BB and 
CV) except Enterprise gain a plus one modification to their AA 
values.  This bonus is only taken away if the ship is ‘dead in the 
water’. 
 20d) Modified victory point values 
With these upgrades in AA capabilities, the victory points for the ships 
mentioned should be changed.  The Yamato is now worth the same as her 
sister, the Musashi, 35 points if sunk and 12 if flipped.  Except for the 
North Carolina, South Dakota, and Iowa classes, all American battleships 
are now worth two more points if sunk and one more if flipped.  This 
makes the Maryland class worth 22 and 8, and the California, 
Pennsylvania, and New Mexico classes worth 21 and 8.  All other ships 
retain their original values. 
 
21) MODIFIED BASE RULES 
21a) In the Philippine Sea scenario the Guam base is already considered to be 
destroyed.  However, it still operates under the following rules: 
21a1) The Guam base uses the capacity and flipped launch values of the 
‘Shortland’ base from Guadalcanal. 
 21a2) The Guam base has a defense value of ‘6a’. 
21a3) The Guam base has an AA value of ‘0’.  This value may be used in 
AA combat every time the base is bombed, and may also be used 
against patrollers (see rule 23d7). 
21b) Base damage during the Leyte Gulf scenarios is treated as follows: 
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21b1) Bases can remove one hit per turn unless it is destroyed or flipped 
with no hits. 
21b2) If a base is flipped, it takes two consecutive turns to repair it to the 
unflipped with two hits state, assuming there is no further damage 
inflicted.  Bases may not unflip until all hits are repaired. 
21b3) If a base is destroyed: 
21b3.1) It takes three consecutive turns to repair it to a 
flipped with two hits state.  Full points for 
destroying a base are only awarded for its initial 
destruction.  For every subsequent time the base is 
destroyed, the opposing player is awarded one-forth 
the bases full worth. 
21b3.2) Air units currently ‘on ground’ of that base roll for 
damage; they are not automatically destroyed (see 
rule 11b, but 11b4 is nullified). 
21b3.3) Air units can still land on that base up to its printed 
capacity.  When landing, each air unit must roll a 
die to determine if it suffers damage upon landing.  
If a ‘0’ or ‘1’ is rolled, that air unit takes a hit. 
21b3.4) Flying seaplane units do not pay heed to rule 
21b3.3.  These units include PBYs, H6Ks, H8Ks, 
and E13As. 
21b3.5) Destroyed bases have an AA value of ‘0’. 
21b4) All new rules outlined in 21b may be used in Midway and 
Guadalcanal scenarios if players desire to use them. 
 
22) FIGHTER-BOMBERS 
22a) Aircraft units that have the F/D designations are fighter-bombers and have 
special abilities beyond normal fighters and/or dive bombers.  F/D air 
units may either be used as fighters or dive bombers. 
22b) Only one F/D unit may be armed as a ‘D’ (dive bomber) per carrier per 
turn. 
22c) F/D units that have been armed as a ‘D’ may switch their designation back 
to an ‘F’ designation at any time and act as a fighter.  Units that have 
switched back to an ‘F’ designation may not switch back to a ‘D’ 
designation until that unit has landed on an aircraft carrier and rearmed. 
22d) The air to air value of F/D units that are armed as ‘D’ units are reduced to 
half their printed value (round up). 
22e) All other rules that apply to ‘D’ units also apply to F/D units armed as ‘D’ 
units.  Conversely, all rules that apply to ‘F’ units also apply to F/D units 
armed as ‘F’ units. 
 
23) ENHANCED FIGHTER RULES 
American fighter squadrons (‘F’ and ‘F/D’ units armed as ‘F’) exhibit special 
properties during the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf scenarios. 
23a) American fighter squadrons always attack first during air-to-air combat. 
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23b) In the Historical scenarios of the Battles of Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, 
American fighter squadrons always achieve a ‘break through’ during air to 
air combat, whether or not their target enemy fighter group has been 
destroyed. 
23c) American fighter squadrons have a one hex patrol area around the task 
force that they have been assigned to as CAP.  Only High CAP squadrons 
may perform these functions. 
23c1) During the enemy search phase, fighter squadrons on High CAP 
may intercept any enemy search planes that enter their patrol area.  
Combat against these search planes are then conducted 
immediately.  Once the CAP unit has moved to intercept and 
conducted combat against the enemy search unit, that CAP unit 
may not be moved again during the search phase to intercept any 
other search units.  However, if other enemy search units enter the 
hex in which the CAP unit was moved to, then the CAP unit may 
attempt to intercept and shoot down the newly arriving search 
unit(s). 
23c2) During the enemy combat phase all CAP units that were 
moved/used during the enemy search phase return to their task 
forces and may perform more interceptions.  If the Japanese player 
has an incoming strike, the Japanese player must state through 
which hex of the CAP’s patrol area the strike is flying through.  If 
the American player wishes, he may then move his CAP unit/s to 
intercept in that hex, and air to air combat proceeds as normal in 
that hex.  Like with intercepting search planes, the CAP flying this 
interception may not move again during the combat phase, but may 
intercept any other Japanese air units flying through that hex.  Any 
surviving Japanese aircraft may then move on to the hex 
containing the target task force, and any CAP still patrolling that 
task force also engage the incoming Japanese strike in normal air 
to air combat. 
23c3) CAP units are not restricted to intercepting search planes or 
incoming strikes that are attacking their specific Task Force.  If the 
target task force is within patrol range, or if the enemy strike 
crosses into the patrol range of another task force while moving to 
the strike’s target, the non-targeted task force’s CAP may be used 
to protect the target task force and intercept enemy strikes.  
However, under no circumstances may the CAP of a task force 
move outside its one hex patrol range. 
23c4) If the Japanese player searches a hex that an American Task Group 
is located without first searching any hexes in the patrol area 
around that Task Group, the Japanese search plane may not be 
intercepted.  However, if the Japanese are searching with their 
strikes (Rule 25a) and find a Task Group, those strikes may always 
be intercepted, and the Japanese player must tell the American 
player which hex the strike traveled through to attack the US fleet. 
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23d) American fighter squadrons may be used to patrol enemy air bases. 
23d1) To patrol an enemy air base the American player flies as many 
fighter squadrons as they want to the enemy base’s hex, and 
indicate with the ‘patrol’ marker on the search board that the 
squadrons are now on patrol. 
23d2) The fighter squadrons may remain on patrol for a maximum of two 
turns, only if they have sufficient fuel 
23d3) Any Japanese squadron attempting to take off or land on that base 
is immediately engaged individually in air to air combat with the 
patrolling American fighter squadrons.   
23d4) Japanese air units are unable to return fire against the intercepting 
American patrol.   
23d5) American patrolling fighters may shoot at a maximum of three 
enemy air units before they must return to their carriers to rearm. 
23d6) During these patrols, any Japanese scout units attempting to land 
have a defense value of one (1) and only need one hit to destroy. 
23d7) Every time an American patroller shoots at a Japanese unit landing 
or taking off, the anti-aircraft guns of the Japanese base gets to 
shoot at the American unit.  The current AA value of the Japanese 
base shoots at the American patroller every time after the patroller 
shoots at a Japanese air unit. 
 
24) TASK FORCE 34/58.7 
24a) Task Force 34/58.7 is a fleet that may be formed and disbanded multiple 
times during the course of a scenario.  To form Task Force 34/58.7, the 
ships from the carrier groups forming the task force must all share a 
common hex that is within one hex or less of all the contributing task 
forces.  If there are multiple common hexes, the American player may 
decide which hex to form the task force in. 
24b) Task Force 34/58.7 is formed at the start of the Sea Movement Step and 
may not move during the turn it is formed.  The carrier task groups that 
contribute to Task Force 34/58.7 may move after the ships of that task 
group have moved out of that group and are placed into the appropriate 
task force box on the operations chart. 
24c) To disband Task Force 34/58.7, the ships in the task force must be placed 
in other friendly task forces are within one hex or less of Task Force 
34/58.7.  Task Force 34/58.7 is disbanded at the start of the sea movement 
step.  When Task Force 34/58.7 is disbanded, no task forces that Task 
Force 34/58.7 has parceled ships into may move that turn. 
24d) Only battleships, cruisers, and destroyers (BB, CA, CL, and DD) may 
form into Task Force 34/58.7.  Aircraft carriers (CV, CVL, CVE) may 
never join Task Force 34/58.7. 
24e) When a carrier task force is sending ships to join Task Force 34/58.7, the 
carrier task force must retain enough escort ships to cover any carriers in 
that task force.  For every one carrier (CV or CVL) in a task force two 
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other ships (BB, CA, CL, or individual DD) must remain in that task force 
to cover the carriers. 
24f) Ships that did not start the game in the carrier groups (Task Groups 38.1, 
38.2, 38.3, 38.4, 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, or 58.4) or in Task Force 34/58.7 may 
not join or form into Task Force 34/58.7. 
 
25) ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT RULES 
Aircraft assigned to air strikes may perform searches (for example, if search 
planes did not find a desired target).  Squadrons in each wave may either 
search hexes individually, or in a group of squadrons.  Squadrons from a 
‘normal strike’ may not join squadrons in a ‘max strike’ in searching, but 
they might be able to attack the same target together. (see rule 26c). 
25a1) If contact is made by a searching squadron/group from ‘normal 
strike’ planes, then out of all ‘normal strike’ attacks, only the 
squadron or group that made this contact can attack that target.  
25a2) All ‘max strike’ attacks may be directed to any contacts made by 
‘normal strike’ searchers. 
25a3) If contact is made by a searching squadron/group from ‘max strike’ 
planes, then out of all ‘max strike’ attacks, only the squadron or 
group that made this contact can attack that target.  
25b) Fighters placed in ‘normal strike’ or ‘max strike’ modes may be redirected 
to become CAP.  ‘Normal strike’ fighters can become High CAP, while 
‘max strike’ fighters can become Low CAP.  Fighters that have been 
redirected to become CAP may not shoot at or attempt to intercept enemy 
search planes.  However, such fighters may intercept incoming enemy 
strikes. 
25c) ‘Normal’ and ‘max’ strikes may be combined into a single strike.  
However, all ‘normal strike’ aircraft that are combining with ‘max strike’ 
aircraft lose one movement point to their range for that turn. 
26) RADAR 
26a) The American advances in radar gave them a tremendous advantage in 
1944.  If the players desire to, the Japanese are always Side B in all 
surface battles played in the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf scenarios 
(including the individual surface scenarios). 
 
 
1) SCENARIO ONE – THE BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA: June 19 – 20, 1944. 
1a) TIME: Starts with June 19, Turn 8 and ends after June 20, Turn 17 (10 Turns). 
1b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION: 
 Task Group 58.1:  Place in any ‘I’ area hex at game’s start. 
  1 CV – Hornet (II):  1F2, 2F2, 3F2, B2, S2, T2, F76B, Scouts I and VIII 
1 CV – Yorktown (II):  1F1, 2F1, 3F1, 1B1, 2B1, S1, T1, F77B, Scouts II 
and IX 
1 CVL – Belleau Wood:  1F24, 2F24, T24, Scout X 
1 CVL – Bataan:  1F50, 2F50, T50, Scout XI 
3 CA – Boston, Baltimore, Canberra (II) 
 110
1 CL – Oakland 
3 DD - #3, #4, #8 
 Task Group 58.2: Place in any ‘I’ area hex at game’s start. 
  1 CV – Bunker Hill:  1F8, 2F8, 3F8, B8, S8, T8, F76A, Scouts III and XII 
1 CV – Wasp (II):  1F14, 2F14, 3F14, B14, S14, T14, F77C, Scouts IV 
and XIII 
1 CVL – Monterey:  1F28, 2F28, T28, Scout XIV 
1 CVL – Cabot:  1F31, 2F31, T31, Scout XV 
4 CL – San Juan, Santa Fe, Mobile, Biloxi 
3 DD - #5, #9, #11 
 Task Group 58.3: Place in any ‘I’ area hex at game’s start. 
1 CV – Enterprise:  1F10, 2F10, 3F10, B10, S10, T10, F101C, Scouts V 
and XVI 
1 CV – Lexington (II):  1F16, 2F16, 3F16, B16, S16, T16, F76C, Scouts 
VI and XVII 
1 CVL – San Jacinto:  1F51, 2F51, T51, Scout XVIII 
1 CVL – Princeton:  1F27, 2F27, T27, Scout XIX 
1 CA – Indianapolis 
4 CL – Reno, Montpelier, Cleveland, Birmingham 
3 DD - #10, #12, #15 
 Task Group 58.4: Place in any ‘I’ area hex at game’s start. 
1 CV – Essex:  1F15, 2F15, 3F15, B15, S15, T15, F77A, Scouts VII and 
XX 
1 CVL – Langley (II):  1F32, 2F32, T32, Scout XXI 
1 CVL – Cowpens:  1F25, 2F25, T25, Scout XXII 
4 CL – San Diego, Vincennes (II), Miami, Houston (II) 
3 DD - #1, #16, #17 
 Task Group 58.7: Place in any ‘I’ area hex at game’s start. 
7 BB – North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Alabama, 
Iowa, New Jersey 
4 CA – Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, San Francisco 
3 DD – #13, #14, #18 
Submarines:  Place in any hex west of column ‘I’ (inclusive) and south of row 
‘5’ (inclusive), a maximum of one submarine per hex, at game’s start. 
11 SS – Albacore, Finback, Seawolf, Stingray, Bang, Flying Fish, 
Seahorse, Muskallunge, Pipefish, Cavalla, Growler 
1c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION 
 A Force:  Place in any ‘III’ area hex at game’s start. 
  1 CV – Taiho:  1TF, 2TF, 1TD, 2TD, TT, Scouts I and V 
  1 CV – Shokaku:  1SF, 2SF, 1SD, 2SD, ST, Scouts II and VI 
  1 CV – Zuikaku:  1ZF, 2ZF, 1ZD, 2ZD, ZT, Scouts III and VIII 
  2 CA – Myoko, Haguro 
  1 CL – Yahagi 
  2 DD - #3, #7 
 B Force:  Place in any ‘III’ area hex at game’s start. 
  1 CV – Junyo:  1JF, 2JF, JD, JT, Scout AA 
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  1 CV – Hiyo:  1HF, 2HF, HD, HT, Scout BB 
  1 CVL – Ryuho:  1RYF, 2RYF, RYT 
  1 BB – Nagato 
  1 CA – Mogami (’43) 
  2 DD - #1, #8 
 C Force:  Place in any ‘II’ area hex at game’s start. 
  1 CVL – Chitose:  1CTF, 2CTF, CTT, Scout VIII 
  1 CVL – Chiyoda:  1CYF, 2CYF, CYT, Scout IX 
  1 CVL – Zuiho:  1ZHF, 2ZHF, ZHT, Scout X 
  4 BB – Yamato, Musashi, Kongo, Haruna 
  2 AV – Chikuma, Tone 
  6 CA – Atago, Chokai, Maya, Takao, Kumano, Suzaya 
  2 DD - #4, #10 
 Supply Force:  Enter in hex ‘A1’, ‘A2’, or ‘A3’ on Turn 12. 
  1 AP – IV 
  1 DD - #2 
 Guam (“O7”) Base: 




1d) Special Rules: 
1d1)  The Japanese side wins by scoring more victory points then the American side.  
The American side wins with 50 or more victory points then the Japanese side 
has. 
1d2) Alternatively, the Japanese side wins by sinking one American carrier (CV or 
CVL).  The American side wins if over 75% of the Japanese air squadrons are 
shot down (30 squadrons or more) or if two or more Japanese carriers (CV and/or 
CVL) are sunk.  Any other result is a tie. 
1d3) The Guam base is already considered to be destroyed at game’s start but can still 
operate planes.  The Guam base uses the capacity and flipped launch value of the 
‘Shortland’ base from Guadalcanal.  The Guam base can be raided and has a 
defense value of 6a. 
1d4) Historical scenario rules 




 If the counter is an ‘F’ unit: 
  Front Side:   Back Side (or front if back reads ELIM): 
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If the counter is an ‘F/D’ unit: 
 Front Side:   Back Side (or front if back reads ELIM): 
    
 
 
If the counter is a ‘D’ or ‘T’ unit: 
 Front Side:   Back Side (or front if back reads ELIM): 
    
 
1d4b) On June 20 the Japanese fleet was low on fuel.  To simulate this, all ships in Forces 
A, B, and C, have a movement factor of ‘2’ on the search board (except for ships 
with a movement factor of ‘1’, which keep their factor unaltered).  However, if a 
Japanese Force reaches the Supply Force and remains in the same hex as the 
Supply Force for one full turn, that Force is considered refueled and can move at 
their printed values on the search board.  The Supply Force may only refuel one 
other Force per turn. 
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1d4c) To accurately replay the Battle of Philippine Sea it is suggested that the American 
player not attack the Japanese fleet before turn 13, and that the Japanese fleet may 
not move to retreat until after turn 12. 
1e) It is highly suggested that rule 12c1 is used during the Philippine Sea scenarios. 
1f) To attempt to balance the game, the Japanese may replace the air groups on their 
carriers as follows: 
  CV Taiho – SHF, ZHF, 2AG2, 2HD, HT, Scouts I and V. 
  CV Shokaku – 1SF, 2SF, 1SD, 2SD, 1ST, Scouts II and VI. 
  CV Zuikaku – 1ZF, 2ZF, 1ZD, 2ZD, 1ZT, Scouts III and VII. 
  CV Junyo – 1SYF, 2SYF, JD, JT, Scout AA. 
  CV Hiyo – 1HYF, 2HYF, 1HD, HT, Scout BB. 
  CVL Ryuho – 1RF, 2RF, ZHT. 
  CVL Chitose – 1AF, 2AF, 1AT, Scout VIII. 
  CVL Chiyoda – 1KF, 2KF, 1KT, Scout IV 
  CVL Zuiho – 1ZHF, 2ZHF, ZHTP. 
 The ranges of these counters should be changed as follows: 
  If the air unit is an ‘F’ unit the range is 8. 
  If the air unit is a ‘D’ unit the range is 5. 
  If the air unit is a ‘T’ unit the range is 6. 
 Also, the unit 2AG2 should be considered to have a white basing color instead of 
green. 
 This replacement represents the abilities of the Japanese air groups if the elite 
Japanese pilots available in 1941 were present at the Battle of Philippine Sea.  All 
of these units (except for the scouts) can be found in the MIDWAY and 
GUADALCANAL games. 




2) SCENARIO TWO:  THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF: October 23 – 25, 1944 
2a) TIME: Starts with October 23, Turn 6 and ends after October 25, Turn 17 (12 turns) 
2b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION 
 Task Group 38.1: Enters any ‘11’ row hex south of ‘N’ column on turn 13. 
1 CV – Wasp (II): 1F14, 2F14, 3F14, 1B14, 2B14, S14, T14, Scouts 
XXIII and UU 
  1 CV – Hornet (II): 1F11, 2F11, 3F11, B11, S11, T11, Scouts V and XI 
  1 CV – Hancock: 1F7, 2F7, 3F7, 1B7, 2B7, S7, T7, Scouts IV and X 
1 CVL – Monterey: 1F28, 2F28, T28, Scout XVIII 
  1 CVL – Cowpens: 1F22, 2F22, T22, Scout XVI 
  3 CA – Chester, Salt Lake City, Pensacola 
  2 CL – Oakland, San Diego 
  3 DD - #3, #4, #9 
Task Group 38.2: Place in any open sea hex south of ‘N’ column and east of the 
Philippines at game’s start. 
  1 CV – Intrepid: 1F18, 2F18, 3F18, B18, S18, T18, Scouts VI and XII 
  1 CVL – Cabot: 1F29, 2F29, T29, Scout XV 
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  1 CVL – Independence: 1F41, 2F41, T41, Scout XXIV 
  2 BB – Iowa, New Jersey 
3 CL – Vincennes (II), Biloxi, Miami 
  3 DD - #1, #8, #11 
Task Group 38.3: Place in any open sea hex south of ‘N’ column and east of the 
Philippines at game’s start. 
1 CV – Essex: 1F15, 2F15, 3F15, 4F15, B15, S15, T15, Scouts II (SB2C) 
and VIII 
1 CV – Lexington (II): 1F19, 2F19, 3F19, B19, S19, T19, Scouts XXII 
and XIII 
  1 CVL – Langley (II): 1F44, 2F44, T44, Scout XVII 
  1 CVL – Princeton: 1F27, 2F27, T27, Scout XIX 
  2 BB – South Dakota, Massachusetts 
  4 CL – Santa Fe, Mobile, Birmingham, Reno 
  3 DD - #12, #13, #14 
Task Group 38.4: Place in any open sea hex south of ‘N’ column and east of the 
Philippines at game’s start. 
1 CV – Enterprise: 1F20, 2F20, 3F20, 1B20, 2B20, S20, T20, Scouts I and 
VII 
1 CV – Franklin: 1F13, 2F13, 3F13, 1B13, 2B13, S13, T13, Scouts III and 
IX 
  1 CVL – San Jacinto: 1F51, 2F51, T51, Scout XX 
  1 CVL – Belleau Wood: 1F21, 2F21, T21, Scout XIV 
  2 BB – Washington, Alabama 
  2 CA – New Orleans, Wichita 
  3 DD - #10, #15, #20 
 Task Group 77.2: Place in hex ‘G9’ (Tacloban base) at game’s start. 
6 BB – Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, West 
Virginia 
3 CA – Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis 
2 CL – Denver, Columbia 
3 DD - #2, #6, #16 
 Task Group 77.3: Place in hex ‘G9’ (Tacloban base) at game’s start. 
  1 CA – Shropshire 
  2 CL – Phoenix, Boise 
  3 DD - #17, #18, #21 
 Task Group 77.4: Place in hex ‘G9’ (Tacloban base) at game’s start. 
1 CVE – Casablanca I: Fsq20, Tsq20, Fsq21, Tsq21, Fsq80, Tsq80, Fsq81, 
Tsq81 
  1 CVE – Casablanca II: Fsq78, Tsq78, Fsq76, Tsq76 
  1 CVE – Casablanca III: Fsq27, Tsq27, Fsq75, Tsq75 
  1 CVE – Casablanca IV: Fsq5, Tsq5, Fsq10, Tsq10 
  1 CVE – 4 CVE: Fsq3, Tsq3, Fsq4, Tsq4, Fsq65, Tsq65, Fsq68, Tsq68 
1 CVE – Sangamon: 1F26, 2F26, T26, 1F35, 2F35, T35, 1F37, 2F37, T37, 
1F60, 2F60, T60 
  2 DD – #5, #7 
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  3 DE – #1, #2, #3 
 Task Group 78.7: Place in any ‘11’ row hex at game’s start. 
  4 AP – I, II, III, IV 
  6 LST – I, II, III, IV, V, VI 
  1 DD – #19 
 Tacloban (G9) Base: Scouts FF, GG, HH, II (PBY) 
 
 
2c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION 
 Carrier Force: Place in any ‘T’ column hex east of Formosa at game’s start. 
1 CV – Shinano: 1SNF, 2SNF, 3SNF, 1SND, 2SND, SNT, Scouts I and V 
(see rule 2d9) 
  1 CV – Zuikaku: 1ZF, 2ZF, 3ZF, 4ZF, 5ZF, 6ZF 
  1 CVL – Chitose: 1CTT, 2CTT 
  1 CVL – Chiyoda: CYD 
  1 CVL – Zuiho: Scout EE 
  2 BB/AV – Hyuga, Ise 
  3 CL – Tama, Oyodo, Isuzu 
  2 DD - #1, #9 (back) 
 Force A: Place in or next to hex ‘G2’ at game’s start. 
  5 BB – Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna 
  2 AV – Tone, Chikuma 
  5 CA – Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzaya 
  2 CL – Noshiro, Yahagi 
  3 DD - #3, #4, #5 
 Force C: Place in or next to hex ‘C3 at game’s start. 
  2 BB – Yamashiro, Fuso 
  1 AV – Mogami ’43 
  1 DD - #7 
Second Striking Force: Place in or next to hex ‘M2 at game’s start. 
 2 CA – Nachi, Ashigara 
 1 CL – Abakuma 
 1 DD – #8 
Clark (M5), Davao (B9), Formosa (T4), and Manila (K5) Bases: Place the 
respective base units in their hexes.  The air units may be spread among them in any 
desired manner, except the AFS and the three D4Y units must be placed at either Manila 
or Clark. 
8 A6Ms, 3 D4Ys, 6 G3Ms, 13 G4Ms, AFS, Scouts II (H8K), JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI 
 
2d) Special Rules: 
2d1) Victory conditions: 
2d1a) The Japanese side wins if they score more points then the American side.  The 
American side wins if they score at least 80 points then the Japanese side. 
2d1b) Alternatively, the Japanese side wins if they engage Task Force 78.7 in surface 
combat and sink twelve transports and/or LSTs (count individual ships).  The 
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American side wins if they can prevent the Japanese victory conditions and sink 
over one third of the Japanese fleet (count individual destroyers), i.e. more then 
21 ships. 
2d1c) American AP and LST units may only unload in hex G9 for victory points.  For 
every AP or LST unit that remains in hex G9 at game’s end, one victory point is 
awarded for every turn each individual AP or LST unit remained in G9 the entire 
turn.  It is suggested that the American player keep a paper record of these points 
during the game. 
2d2) The Japanese side holds the free roll marker at the game’s start.  The night fighting 
modifier to the Japanese side’s roll is –2. 
2d3) American escort carrier aircraft special rules. 
2d3a) Aircraft that start on escort carriers (CVEs) at the start of the game may only base 
on escort carriers or Tacloban airbase unless there is no longer enough capacity to 
hold all the planes (due to sinkings), in which case they may base on any other 
carrier in range. 
2d3b) The fighters and fighter/dive bombers of these aircraft groups may only be used for 
defensive purposes only.  These aircraft may also only attack an enemy fleet if 
that fleet is located and found to be within one hex or less of the location of the 
escort carriers.  Also, an enemy fleet that attacked the escort carriers a turn 
previous to the current one may be attacked by the escort carrier’s air groups no 
matter what distance it is from the escort carriers.  The escort carrier’s planes may 
also attack any other enemy fleets that are in the same hex of the enemy fleet 
under attack, whether that fleet attacked the escort carriers earlier or not. 
2d4) Movement restrictions 
2d4a) American Task Groups 77.2, 77.3, 77.4, and 78.7 must stay within two hexes of 
Tacloban airbase at all times. 
2d4b) Ships in Task Groups 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, 38.4, and Task Force 34 may not recombine 
with any ships in Task Groups 77.2, 77.3, 77.4, and 78.7, and vice-versa. 
2d4c) Japanese Task Groups may not withdraw from the map board until either two 
Japanese carriers have been sunk, or the both battleships Yamato and Musashi 
have been sunk.  If the Japanese engage U.S. Task Force 78 in surface combat, 
the Japanese Task Groups may then withdraw. 
2d5)  Kamikazes 
2d5a) The Kamikaze unit (designated with a ‘K’) is not present at the start of the game.  
It is formed during the Assembly step any turn after October 24.  To form the 
Kamikaze unit the Japanese player may use any surviving land based ‘D’ or ‘F’ 
unit. 
2d5b) If the Kamikaze unit is formed from an unflipped squadron, flip the squadron to its 
back side and place the Kamikaze unit at the base the squadron is located (Note: 
there are now two air units created from the single squadron).  If the Kamikaze 
unit is formed from a flipped squadron, remove that squadron from the game and 
replace it with the Kamikaze unit.  Any hits that the original squadron had 
suffered must either remain on the original squadron (which would also now be 
flipped) or transferred to the Kamikaze unit.  Obviously, hits may only be retained 
on the original squadron if that squadron began unflipped.  If the original 
(unflipped) squadron had two hits, these hits may not be split up (such as one hit 
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on the now flipped original squadron and one hit on the Kamikaze unit; instead, 
both hits must either follow to the new K unit, or stay with the original squadron). 
2d5c) Kamikazes are not destroyed in the usual manner of other air squadrons.  
Kamikazes can only be destroyed from hits; they cannot be flipped or eliminated 
outright a single combat.   Hits are obtained by exceeding the Japanese die roll in 
combat, as in normal air combat.  However, if a Kamikaze suffers two hits before 
making its attack on a U.S. ship, the K unit suffers a –2 penalty to its bombing 
and defense factors. 
2d5d) Kamikazes attack like dive bombers, so if the target has any aircraft in its ready 
box on its air-ops card, then the Kamikaze gets a +4 bonus. 
2d6) Task Group 38.1 
2d6a) Task Group 38.1 begins off the map and can be brought in on the stated turn if the 
American player desires.  If Task Group 38.1 is brought onto the game map the 
Japanese player is awarded 50 points at game’s end. 
2d7) Historical scenario: The rules outlined in rule 1d4a in the Philippine Sea scenario 
also apply to the historical scenario of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. 
2d8) The AFS unit must be used in the Historical scenario.  But in the non-historic 
scenarios, the Japanese scouts 'M' and ‘N’ from the MIDWAY game may replace 
the AFS unit.  These scouts are placed on the cruiser Tone and Chikuma at the 
choice of the Japanese player.  Once the Japanese player decides to use the scouts 
or the AFS unit, the player may not change that decision at any time during the 
game. 
2d9) Although she was not completed in time, the Japanese player may add the carrier 
Shinano and her air group to the Carrier Force.  The Shinano may be added in any 
scenario except the Historical. 
2d10) To attempt to balance the game, the Japanese may replace the air groups on their 
carriers as follows: 
  Zuikaku – 1ZF, 2ZF, 1ZD, 2ZD, ZT, Scouts II and VI 
  CVL Chitose – 1CTF, 2CTF, CTT, Scout VII 
  CVL Chiyoda – 1CYF, 2CYF, CYT, Scout VIII 
  CVL Zuiho – 1ZHF, 2ZHF, ZHT, Scout IX 
 This replacement represents the abilities of the Japanese air groups if well trained 
Japanese pilots were present at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.  All of these units are 
part of the counters used for the Battle of Philippine Sea. 
2d11) In all scenarios (2,3, 5, and 6), if any American transports or LSTs are sunk in 
surface combat they are worth double the victory points they are normally worth. 
 
3) Scenario Three: Nishimura and Shima vs. Oldendorf: 
 This is not an overall scenario as were scenarios One and Two.  This scenario is 
designed to demonstrate how a surface combat is conducted, and covers only the 
one surface action as a complete scenario.  It is recommended for players who 
have just read through option 16, which must be used, and wish to see how a 
surface combat works, or for players looking for a fast game.  The Search boards 
are not needed to setup this scenario, only the Battle board, the two Surface Turn 
markers, and the ship units given below: 
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3a) TIME: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat ends.  This 
combat takes place during a day turn. 
3b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this turn 
(and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite hex 
sides. 
6 BB – Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, West 
Virginia 
4 CA – Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis, Shropshire 
4 CL – Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise 
7 DD - #2, #6, #16, #17, #18, #19, #21 
4 AP – I, II, III, IV 
6 LST – I, II, III, IV, V, VI 
3c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this 
turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite 
hex sides. 
 2 BB – Yamashiro, Fuso 
 1 AV – Mogami ’43 
 2 CA – Nachi, Ashigara 
 1 CL – Abakuma 
2 DD - #7, #8 
3d) SPECIAL RULES: 
3d1) The Japanese side wins with more victory points then the Allied side has.  
The Allied side wins with five or more victory points then the Japanese 
side has.  Any other result is a ‘tie’ game. 
3d2) Assume that the opposing task force units entered the battle hex through 
opposite hexsides, so the ship units setup facing in opposite directions. 
3d3) The Allied side holds the free roll marker at game’s start. 
3e) SURIGAO STRAIT 
If players wish to play the historical Battle of Surigao Strait, a few changes can be 
made to this scenario. 
3e1) Remove the Allied DD #19 and all AP and LST units. 
3e2) The combat takes place during a night turn.  The night fighting modifier to 
the Japanese side’s roll is –3. 
 
4) SCENARIO FOUR: KURITA VS. LEE 
 This is not an overall scenario as were scenarios One and Two.  This scenario is 
designed to demonstrate how a surface combat is conducted, and covers only the 
one surface action as a complete scenario.  It is recommended for players who 
have just read through option 16, which must be used, and wish to see how a 
surface combat works, or for players looking for a fast game.  The Searchboards 
are not needed to setup this scenario, only the Battleboard, the two Surface Turn 
markers, and the ship units given below: 
4a) TIME: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat ends.  This 
combat takes place during a day turn. 
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4b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this turn 
(and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite hex 
sides. 
6 BB – Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, Massachusetts, Washington, Alabama 
2 CA – New Orleans, Wichita  
3 CL – Vincennes (II), Biloxi, Miami, Santa Fe, Mobile 
 4 DD - #8, #10, #11, #15 
4c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this 
turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite 
hex sides. 
4 BB – Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna 
 2 AV – Tone, Chikuma 
 5 CA – Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzaya 
 2 CL – Noshiro, Yahagi 
 3 DD - #3, #4, #5 
4d) SPECIAL RULES: 
4d1) The Japanese side wins with 25 or more victory points then the Allied side 
has.  The Allied side wins with 20 or more victory points then the 
Japanese side has.  Any other result is a ‘tie’ game. 
4d2) Assume that the opposing task force units entered the battle hex through 
opposite hexsides, so the ship units setup facing in opposite directions. 
4d3) The Allied side holds the free roll marker at game’s start. 
 
5) KURITA, NISHIMURA, & SHIMA vs. OLDENDORF 
 This is not an overall scenario as were scenarios One and Two.  This scenario is 
designed to demonstrate how a surface combat is conducted, and covers only the 
one surface action as a complete scenario.  It is recommended for players who 
have just read through option 16, which must be used, and wish to see how a 
surface combat works, or for players looking for a fast game.  The Searchboards 
are not needed to setup this scenario, only the Battleboard, the two Surface Turn 
markers, and the ship units given below: 
5a) TIME: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat ends.  This 
combat takes place during a day turn. 
5b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this turn 
(and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite hex 
sides. 
6 BB – Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, West 
Virginia 
4 CA – Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis, Shropshire 
4 CL – Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise 
7 DD - #2, #6, #16, #17, #18, #19, #21 
4 AP – I, II, III, IV 
6 LST – I, II, III, IV, V, VI 
5c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION: Assume the Japanese are side B this 
turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from opposite 
hex sides. 
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 6 BB – Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna, Yamashiro, Fuso 
 1 AV – Mogami ’43, Tone 
 2 CA – Nachi, Ashigara, Myoko, Haguro 
 1 CL – Abakuma, Noshiro, Yahagi 
2 DD - #3, #4, #5, #7, #8 
5d) SPECIAL RULES: 
5d1) The Japanese side wins with 15 or more victory points then the Allied side 
has.  The Allied side wins with 5 or more victory points then the Japanese 
side has.  Any other result is a ‘tie’ game. 
5d2) Assume that the opposing task force units entered the battle hex through 
opposite hexsides, so the ship units setup facing in opposite directions. 
5d3) The Allied side holds the free roll marker at game’s start. 
6) KURITA vs. SPRAGUE, TRANSPORTS, THEN OLDENDORF 
 This is not an overall scenario as were scenarios One and Two.  This scenario is 
designed to demonstrate how a surface combat is conducted, and covers only the 
one surface action as a complete scenario.  It is recommended for players who 
have just read through option 16, which must be used, and wish to see how a 
surface combat works, or for players looking for a fast game.  The Searchboards 
are not needed to setup this scenario, only the Battleboard, the two Surface Turn 
markers, and the ship units given below.  This surface battle is divided into three 
phases. 
6a) TIME PHASE 1: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat 
ends.  This combat takes place during a day turn. 
6b) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 1: Assume the Japanese are side B 
this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides. 
1 CVE – Casablanca I: Fsq20, Tsq20, Fsq21, Tsq21, Fsq80, Tsq80, Fsq81, Tsq81 
 1 CVE – Casablanca II: Fsq78, Tsq78, Fsq76, Tsq76 
 1 CVE – Casablanca III: Fsq27, Tsq27, Fsq75, Tsq75 
 1 CVE – Casablanca IV: Fsq5, Tsq5, Fsq10, Tsq10 
 1 CVE – 4 CVE: Fsq3, Tsq3, Fsq4, Tsq4, Fsq65, Tsq65, Fsq68, Tsq68 
1 CVE – Sangamon: 1F26, 2F26, T26, 1F35, 2F35, T35, 1F37, 2F37, T37, 1F60, 
2F60, T60 
 2 DD – #5, #7 
 3 DE – #1, #2, #3 
6c) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 1: Assume the Japanese are 
side B this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides. 
4 BB – Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, Haruna 
 2 AV – Tone, Chikuma 
 5 CA – Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzaya 
 2 CL – Noshiro, Yahagi 
 3 DD - #3, #4, #5 
6d) All aircraft on the escort carriers may launch an air strike that does not exceed 
their launch capacity against the Japanese fleet before the surface battle begins.  
These planes land back on any surviving escort carriers at the end of the surface 
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combat.  Any planes that cannot land on the escort carriers may then land on 
Tacloban base.  If there are more planes then Tacloban base can hold, then these 
planes are considered destroyed and count for victory points. 
6e) TIME PHASE 2: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat 
ends.  This combat takes place during a day turn. 
6f) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 2: Assume the Japanese are side B 
this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides. 
4 AP – I, II, III, IV 
 6 LST – I, II, III, IV, V, VI 
 1 DD – #19 
6g) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 2: Assume the Japanese are 
side B this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides.  Any Japanese vessels that survived phase 1 are used again in 
part 2.  Any damage these ships suffered in phase 1 is retained. 
6h) All aircraft on the escort carriers and Tacloban base may launch an air strike that 
does not exceed their launch capacity against the Japanese fleet before the surface 
battle begins.  These planes land back on any surviving escort carriers at the end 
of the surface combat.  Any planes that cannot land on the escort carriers may 
then land on Tacloban base.  If there are more planes then Tacloban base can 
hold, then these planes are considered destroyed and count for victory points. 
6i) TIME PHASE 3: Starts with Surface Turn 1, and ends when the surface combat 
ends.  This combat takes place during a day turn. 
6j) ALLIED SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 3: Assume the Japanese are side B 
this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides. 
6 BB – Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, West 
Virginia 
4 CA – Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis, Shropshire 
4 CL – Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise 
6 DD - #2, #6, #16, #17, #18, #21 
6k) JAPANESE SETUP INFORMATION PHASE 3: Assume the Japanese are 
side B this turn (and therefore setup first), and the opponents entered the hex from 
opposite hex sides.  Any Japanese vessels that survived phases 1 and 2 are used 
again in phase 3.  Any damage these ships suffered in phases 1 and 2 is retained. 
6l) SPECIAL RULES: 
6l1) The Japanese side wins with 30 or more victory points then the Allied side 
has.  The Allied side wins with more victory points then the Japanese side 
has.  Any other result is a ‘tie’ game. 
6l2) Assume that the opposing task force units entered the battle hex through 
opposite hexsides, so the ship units setup facing in opposite directions. 






































UNITED STATES & ALLIED SHIPS FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Points if Sunk From: Used in: Notes
combat factor factor /Flipped
Enterprise CV 1d - 5 3 3c 31/12 MG MGPSLG
Essex CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 GEN PSLG
Yorktown (II) CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 PS PS
Intrepid CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 LG LG
Hornet (II) CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 PSLG PSLG
Franklin CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 LG LG
Lexington (II) CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 PSLG PSLG
Bunker Hill CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 PS PS
Wasp (II) CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 PSLG PSLG
Hancock CV 1d - 7 3 4c 37/15 LG LG
Independence CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 GEN LG
Princeton CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Belleau Wood CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Cowpens CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Monterey CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Cabot CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Bataan CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PS PS
Langley (II) CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
San Jacinto CVL - - 4 3 3c 19/7 PSLG PSLG
Sangamon CVE 0d - 4 2 2d 24/14 LG LG
4 CVE CVE 0d - 4 2 2d 23/14 GEN LG
Casablanca I CVE 0d - 4 2 2d 23/14 LG LG
Casablanca II CVE 0d - 2 2 2d 14/- LG LG
Casablanca III CVE 0d - 2 2 2d 14/- LG LG
Casablanca IV CVE 0d - 2 2 2d 14/- LG LG
Pennsylvania BB 5a - 2 2 6a 19/7 GEN LG
Mississippi BB 5a - 2 2 6a 19/7 M LG
California BB 5a - 2 2 6a 20/7 GEN LG
Tennessee BB 5a - 2 2 6a 20/7 M LG
Maryland BB 7a - 2 2 6a 21/8 M LG
West Virginia BB 7a - 2 2 6a 21/8 GEN LG
North Carolina BB 9a - 6 3 8a 30/10 G GPS
Washington BB 9a - 6 3 8a 30/10 G GPSLG
South Dakota BB 9a - 7 3 8a 30/10 G GPSLG
Indiana BB 9a - 7 3 8a 30/10 GEN PS
Massachusetts BB 9a - 7 3 8a 30/10 GEN LG
Alabama BB 9a - 7 3 8a 30/10 GEN PSLG
Iowa BB 10a - 9 3 9a* 35/12 GEN PSLG A
New Jersey BB 10a - 9 3 9a* 35/12 GEN PSLG A
Baltimore CA 3b - 4 3 3b 11/3. GEN PS
Boston CA 3b - 4 3 3b 11/3. PS PS
Canberra (II) CA 3b - 4 3 3b 11/3. PS PS
Shropshire CA 3b* 1 2 3 3b 10/3. LG LG B
Salt Lake City CA 3b - 2 3 3b 10/3. G GLG
Pensacola CA 3b - 2 3 3b 10/3. M GLG
Louisville CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. GEN LG B
Chester CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. GEN LG B
San Francisco CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. G GPS B
New Orleans CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. M MGPSLG B
Minneapolis CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. M MGPSLG B
Indianapolis CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. GEN PS B
Portland CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. M MGLG B
Wichita CA 3b* - 2 3 3b 10/3. GEN PSLG B
Cleveland CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. GEN PS
Montpelier CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PS PS
Houston (II) CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PS PS
Santa Fe CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Mobile CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Biloxi CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Miami CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Vincennes (II) CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Birmingham CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. PSLG PSLG
Columbia CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. LG LG
Denver CL 3c - 3 3 3b 10/3. LG LG
Phoenix CL 3c - 3 3 3b 9/3. LG LG
Boise CL 2c - 2 3 3b 9/3. LG LG
San Diego CL 2d 1 3 3 2c 7/2. G PSLG
San Juan CL 2d 1 3 3 2c 7/2. G PS
Oakland CL 2d 1 3 3 2c 7/2. PSLG PSLG
Reno CL 2d 1 3 3 2c 7/2. PSLG PSLG
1 DD 3d 6 2 3 3d 17/7 M MGPSLG
2 DD 3d 6 2 3 3d 17/7 M MGLG
3 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 M MGPSLG
4 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 M MGPSLG
5 DD 2d 3 2 3 2d 7/- M MGPSLG
6 DD 3d 6 2 3 3d 17/7 G GLG
7 DD 3d 6 2 3 3d 17/7 G GLG
8 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 G GPSLG
9 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 G GPSLG
10 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 G GPSLG
11 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 PS PSLG
12 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 PS PSLG
13 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 PS PSLG
14 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 PS PSLG
15 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 PS PSLG
16 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 PS PSLG
17 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 PS PSLG
18 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 PS PSLG
19 DD 2d 4 2 3 2d 14/6 LG LG
20 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 LG LG
21 DD 3d 5 2 3 3d 16/7 LG LG
1 DE 1d 1 2 2 1d 10/4. LG LG
2 DE 1d 1 2 2 1d 10/4. LG LG
3 DE 0d 0 1 2 1d 4/- LG LG
I AP - - 2 1 2d 17/9 G GLG
II AP - - 2 1 2d 17/9 LG LG
III AP - - 2 1 2d 17/9 LG LG
IV AP - - 2 1 2d 17/9 LG LG
I LST - - 2 1 1d 16/8 LG LG
II LST - - 2 1 1d 16/8 LG LG
III LST - - 2 1 1d 16/8 LG LG
IV LST - - 2 1 1d 16/8 LG LG
V LST - - 2 1 1d 16/8 LG LG
VI LST - - 1 1 0d 8/- LG LG
Albacore SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Finback SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Seawolf SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Stingray SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Bang SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Flying Fish SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Seahorse SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Muskallunge SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Pipefish SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Cavalla SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
Growler SS - 2 - 1 - 2/- PS PS
UNITED STATES & ALLIED SHIPS BACK SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Notes
combat factor factor
Enterprise CV 0d - 3 2 2c
Essex CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Yorktown (II) CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Intrepid CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Hornet (II) CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Franklin CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Lexington (II) CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Bunker Hill CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Wasp (II) CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Hancock CV 0d - 4 2 2c
Independence CVL - - 2 1 1c
Princeton CVL - - 2 1 1c
Belleau Wood CVL - - 2 1 1c
Cowpens CVL - - 2 1 1c
Monterey CVL - - 2 1 1c
Cabot CVL - - 2 1 1c
Bataan CVL - - 2 1 1c
Langley (II) CVL - - 2 1 1c
San Jacinto CVL - - 2 1 1c
Sangamon CVE 0d - 2 2* 2d C
4 CVE CVE 0d - 2 2* 2d C
Casablanca I CVE 0d - 2 2* 2d C
Casablanca II CVE - - - - -
Casablanca III CVE - - - - -
Casablanca IV CVE - - - - -
Pennsylvania BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Mississippi BB 3a - 1 1 3a
California BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Tennessee BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Maryland BB 3a - 1 1 3a
West Virginia BB 3a - 1 1 3a
North Carolina BB 4a - 3 1 4a
Washington BB 4a - 3 1 4a
South Dakota BB 4a - 4 1 4a
Indiana BB 4a - 4 1 4a
Massachusetts BB 4a - 4 1 4a
Alabama BB 4a - 4 1 4a
Iowa BB 5a - 5 2 5a* A
New Jersey BB 5a - 5 2 5a* A
Baltimore CA 2b - 2 2 2b
Boston CA 2b - 2 2 2b
Canberra (II) CA 2b - 2 2 2b
Shropshire CA 2b* 0 1 2* 2b* B
Salt Lake City CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Pensacola CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Louisville CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Chester CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
San Francisco CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
New Orleans CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Minneapolis CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Indianapolis CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Portland CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Wichita CA 2b* - 1 2* 2b* B
Cleveland CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Montpelier CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Houston (II) CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Santa Fe CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Mobile CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Biloxi CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Miami CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Vincennes (II) CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Birmingham CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Columbia CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Denver CL 1c - 2 2 2b
Phoenix CL 2c - 1 2 1b
Boise CL 1c - 1 2 1b
San Diego CL 1d 0 1 1 1c
San Juan CL 1d 0 1 1 1c
Oakland CL 1d 0 1 1 1c
Reno CL 1d 0 1 1 1c
1 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
2 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
3 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
4 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
5 DD - - - - -
6 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
7 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
8 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
9 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
10 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
11 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
12 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
13 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
14 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
15 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
16 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
17 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
18 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
19 DD 1d 2 1 3 2d
20 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
21 DD 2d 3 1 3 2d
1 DE 0d 0 1 2 0d
2 DE 0d 0 1 2 0d
3 DE - - - - -
I AP - - 1 1 1d
II AP - - 1 1 1d
III AP - - 1 1 1d
IV AP - - 1 1 1d
I LST - - 1 1 0d
II LST - - 1 1 0d
III LST - - 1 1 0d
IV LST - - 1 1 0d
V LST - - 1 1 0d
VI LST - - - - -
Albacore SS - - - - -
Finback SS - - - - -
Seawolf SS - - - - -
Stingray SS - - - - -
Bang SS - - - - -
Flying Fish SS - - - - -
Seahorse SS - - - - -
Muskallunge SS - - - - -
Pipefish SS - - - - -
Cavalla SS - - - - -
Growler SS - - - - -
-
AMERICAN BASES FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Points if Sunk From: Used in:
combat factor factor /Flipped
Tacloban B - - 4 - 5a 4/2. LG LG
AMERICAN BASES BACK SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense
combat factor factor
Tacloban B - - 2 - 5a
JAPANESE SHIPS FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Points if Sunk From: Used in: Notes
combat factor factor /Flipped
Shokaku CV 1d - 4 3 3c 27/11 G GPSLG
Zuikaku CV 1d - 4 3 3c 27/11 G GPSLG
Junyo CV 1d - 3 2 3c 22/8 G GPS
Hiyo CV 1d - 3 2 3c 22/8 G GPS
Taiho CV 0d - 5 3 4c 25/11 GEN PS
Shinano CV 2d - 7 3 9a 38/16 LG LG
Chiyoda CVL 1d - 3 3 3c 17/6 GEN PSLG
Chitose CVL 1d - 3 3 3c 17/6 GEN PSLG
Zuiho CVL 0d - 2 3 2c 15/5 M MGPSLG
Ryuho CVL - - 2 2 1d 11/5. PS PS
Ise BB/AV 3a - 3 2 5a 22/8 GEN LG
Hyuga BB/AV 3a - 3 2 5a 22/8 GEN LG
Mogami AV 2b - 3 3 3b 13/6 GEN PSLG
Tone AV 3b* 3 2 3 3b 13/6 M MGPSLG B
Chikuma AV 3b* 3 2 3 3b 13/6 M MGPSLG B
Yamato BB 10a - 4 3 9a 35/12 M MPSLG
Musashi BB 10a - 7 3 9a 35/12 GEN PSLG
Nagato BB 6a - 2 2 6a 20/7 M MPSLG
Yamashiro BB 5a - 2 2 5a 18/7 M MLG
Fuso BB 5a - 2 2 5a 18/7 M MLG
Kongo BB 4a - 2 3 4a* 16/5 M MGPSLG D
Haruna BB 4a - 2 3 4a* 16/5 M MGPSLG D
Atago CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 M MGPSLG
Ashigara CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 GEN LG
Haguro CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 M MGPSLG
Myoko CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 M MGPSLG
Maya CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 G GPSLG
Nachi CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 GEN LG
Takao CA 3b 4 2 3 3b 13/5 G GPSLG
Chokai CA 3b 2 2 3 3b 12/4. M MGPSLG
Suzuya CA 3b 3 2 3 3b 13/5 M MGPSLG
Kumano CA 3b 3 2 3 3b 13/5 M MGPSLG
Oyodo CL 1c - 2 3 2d 5/2. GEN LG
Noshiro CL 1c 2 2 3 2d 8/2. GEN LG
Yahagi CL 1c 2 2 3 2d 8/2. GEN PSLG
Tama CL 1d 2 1 3 2c 7/3. LG LG
Isuzu CL 1d 2 1 3 2c 7/3. G GLG
Abukuma CL 1d 2 1 3 2c 7/3. GEN LG
1 DD 3d 9 2 3 3d 21/10 M MPSLG
2 DD 3d 9 2 3 3d 21/10 M MPS
3 DD 3d 8 2 3 3d 20/9 M MPSLG
4 DD 3d 8 2 3 3d 20/9 M MPSLG
5 DD 3d 8 2 3 3d 20/9 M MLG
7 DD 2d 6 2 3 2d 16/7 M MPSLG
8 DD 2d 6 2 3 2d 16/7 M MPSLG
9 DD 2d 6 2 3 2d 16/7 M MLG
10 DD 2d 5 1 3 2d 10/- M MPS
IV AP - - 1 1 2d 18/7 G GPS
JAPANESE SHIPS BACK SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Notes
combat factor factor
Shokaku CV 0d - 2 2 2c
Zuikaku CV 0d - 2 2* 2c E
Junyo CV 0d - 1 1 1c
Hiyo CV 0d - 1 1 1c
Taiho CV - - 3 2 2c
Shinano CV 1d - 4 1 5a
Chiyoda CVL 0d - 2 1 1c
Chitose CVL 0d - 2 1 1c
Zuiho CVL - - 1 1 1c
Ryuho CVL - - 1 1 0d
Ise BB/AV 1a - 2 1 3a
Hyuga BB/AV 1a - 2 1 3a
Mogami AV 1b - 2 2 2b
Tone AV 2b* 2 1 2 2b B
Chikuma AV 2b* 2 1 2 2b B
Yamato BB 5a - 2 1 5a
Musashi BB 5a - 4 1 5a
Nagato BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Yamashiro BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Fuso BB 3a - 1 1 3a
Kongo BB 2a - 1 1 2a
Haruna BB 2a - 1 1 2a
Atago CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Ashigara CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Haguro CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Myoko CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Maya CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Nachi CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Takao CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Chokai CA 2b 1 1 2 2b
Suzuya CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Kumano CA 2b 2 1 2 2b
Oyodo CL 0c - 1 1 1d
Noshiro CL 0c 1 1 1 1d
Yahagi CL 0c 1 1 1 1d
Tama CL 0d 1 0 1 1c
Isuzu CL 0d 1 0 2 1c
Abukuma CL 0d 1 0 2 1c
1 DD 2d 5 1 3 2d
2 DD 2d 5 1 3 2d
3 DD 1d 4 1 3 2d
4 DD 1d 4 1 3 2d
5 DD 1d 4 1 3 2d
7 DD 1d 3 1 3 2d
8 DD 1d 3 1 3 2d
9 DD 1d 3 1 3 2d
10 DD - - - - -
IV AP - - 1 1 1d
JAPANESE BASES FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense Points if Sunk From: Used in:
combat factor factor /Flipped
Clark B - - 7 - 7a 10/5. LG LG
Davao B - - 4 - 5a 4/2. LG LG
Formosa B 3c - 9 - 12a 14/7 LG LG
Manila B - - 6 - 7a 9/4. LG LG
JAPANESE BASES BACK SIDE VALUES
Name Type Surface Torpedo AA factor Speed Defense
Clark B - - 4 - 7a
Davao B - - 2 - 5a
Formosa B 2c - 5 - 12a
Manila B - - 3 - 7a
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Picture Basing Air to Air Bombing Range Defense Points if destroyed From: Used in:
Color factor factor Factor /flipped
F76A F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F76B F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F76C F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F77A F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F77B F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F77C F* Hellcat White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
F101C F* Corsair White 2 - 7 1 1/- PS PS
Fsq3 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq4 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq5 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq10 F Wildcat White 7 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq20 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq21 F Wildcat White 5 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq27 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq65 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq68 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq75 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq76 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq78 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq80 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
Fsq81 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
1F26 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
2F26 F Wildcat White 6 - 4 2 2/1. LG LG
2B14 F/D Hellcat White 5 5 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F1 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F1 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
3F1 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F2 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F2 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
3F2 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F7 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F7 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F7 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F8 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F8 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
3F8 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F10 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F10 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PS PS
3F10 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F11 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F11 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F11 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F13 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F13 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F13 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F14 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
2F14 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
3F14 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
1F15 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
2F15 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
3F15 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
4F15 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F16 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F16 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
3F16 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F18 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F18 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F18 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F19 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F19 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F19 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F20 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F20 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
3F20 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F21 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F21 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F22 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F22 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F24 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F24 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F25 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F25 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F27 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F27 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F28 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
2F28 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
1F29 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F29 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 2 1/- LG LG
1F31 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F31 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F32 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F32 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F35 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F35 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F37 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F37 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F41 F/D* Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F41 F/D* Hellcat White 3 2 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F44 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F44 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1F50 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
2F50 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PS PS
1F51 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
2F51 F/D Hellcat White 7 4 7 2 3/1. PSLG PSLG
1F60 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
2F60 F/D Hellcat White 6 3 7 2 3/1. LG LG
1B1 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
2B1 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S1 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
B2 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S2 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
1B7 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
2B7 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S7 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
B8 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S8 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
B10 D Dauntless White 3 7 5 2 3/1. GPS GPS
S10 D Dauntless White 3 7 5 2 3/1. GPS GPS
B11 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S11 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
1B13 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
2B13 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S13 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
B14 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S14 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
1B14 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S14 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
B15 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S15 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
B15 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S15 D Helldiver White 3 7 7 2 4/2. LG LG
B16 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
S16 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. PS PS
B18 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S18 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
B19 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S19 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
1B20 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
2B20 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
S20 D Helldiver White 3 8 7 2 4/2. LG LG
T26 D Avenger White 1 2 5 1 1/- LG LG
T35 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T37 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T60 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
Tsq3 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq4 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq5 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq10 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq20 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq21 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq27 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq65 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq68 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq75 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq76 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
Tsq78 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq80 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
Tsq81 D Avenger White 2 3 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T1 T Avenger White 2 4 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T2 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T7 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T8 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T10 T Avenger White 2 4 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T11 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T13 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T14 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T14 T Avenger White 2 4 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T15 T Avenger White 3 6 7 2 2/1. PSLG PSLG
T16 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. PS PS
T18 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T19 T Avenger White 2 5 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T20 T Avenger White 3 6 7 2 2/1. LG LG
T21 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T22 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T24 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T25 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T27 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PSLG PSLG
T28 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PSLG PSLG
T29 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T31 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T32 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T41 T* Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T44 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- LG LG
T50 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T51 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1 1/- PS PS
T51 T Avenger White 1 2 7 0 1/- LG LG
FF S Catalina Green - - 9 - 1/- GLG GLG
GG S Catalina Green - - 9 - 1/- GLG GLG
HH S Catalina Green - - 9 - 1/- GLG GLG
II S Catalina Green - - 9 - 1/- GLG GLG
RR S Dauntless White - - 6 - 1/- GPS GPS
UU S Avenger White - - 6 - 1/- GLG GLG
I S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
II S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
III S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
IV S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
V S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VI S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VIII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
IX S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
X S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XI S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XIII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XIV S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XV S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XVI S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XVII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XVIII S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XIX S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XX S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XXI S Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
XXII S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- LG LG
XXIII S Helldiver White - - 7 - 1/- LG LG
XXIV S* Avenger White - - 7 - 1/- LG LG
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT BACK SIDE VALUES
Name Type Picture Basing Air to Air Bombing Range Defense
Color factor factor Factor
F76A F* Hellcat White - - - -
F76B F* Hellcat White - - - -
F76C F* Hellcat White - - - -
F77A F* Hellcat White - - - -
F77B F* Hellcat White - - - -
F77C F* Hellcat White - - - -
F101C F* Corsair White - - - -
Fsq3 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq4 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq5 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq10 F Wildcat White 4 - 4 1
Fsq20 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq21 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq27 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq65 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq68 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq75 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq76 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq78 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq80 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
Fsq81 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
1F26 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
2F26 F Wildcat White 3 - 4 1
2B14 F/D Hellcat White 3 3 7 1
1F1 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F1 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F1 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F2 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F2 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F2 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F7 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F7 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F7 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F8 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F8 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F8 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F10 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F10 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
3F10 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1F11 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F11 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F11 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F13 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F13 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F13 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F14 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F14 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
3F14 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1F15 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F15 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F15 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
4F15 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F16 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F16 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F16 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F18 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F18 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F18 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F19 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F19 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F19 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F20 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F20 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
3F20 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F21 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F21 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F22 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F22 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F24 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F24 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F25 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F25 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F27 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F27 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F28 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F28 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1F29 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F29 F/D Hellcat White - - - -
1F31 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F31 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F32 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F32 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1F35 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F35 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1F37 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F37 F/D Hellcat White - - - -
1F41 F/D* Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F41 F/D* Hellcat White - - - -
1F44 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F44 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F50 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F50 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F51 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
2F51 F/D Hellcat White 4 2 7 1
1F60 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
2F60 F/D Hellcat White 3 2 7 1
1B1 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
2B1 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S1 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B2 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S2 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
1B7 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
2B7 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S7 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B8 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S8 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B10 D Dauntless White 2 4 5 1
S10 D Dauntless White 2 4 5 1
B11 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S11 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
1B13 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
2B13 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S13 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B14 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S14 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
1B14 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S14 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B15 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S15 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B15 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S15 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B16 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S16 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B18 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S18 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
B19 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S19 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
1B20 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
2B20 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
S20 D Helldiver White 2 4 7 1
T26 D Avenger White - - - -
T35 D Avenger White - - - -
T37 D Avenger White - - - -
T60 D Avenger White - - - -
Tsq3 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq4 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq5 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq10 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq20 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq21 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq27 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq65 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq68 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq75 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq76 D Avenger White - - - -
Tsq78 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq80 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
Tsq81 D Avenger White 1 2 7 1
T1 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1
T2 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T7 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T8 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T10 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1
T11 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T13 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T14 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T14 T Avenger White 1 2 7 1
T15 T Avenger White 2 3 7 1
T16 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T18 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T19 T Avenger White 1 3 7 1
T20 T Avenger White 2 3 7 1
T21 T Avenger White - - - -
T22 T Avenger White - - - -
T24 T Avenger White - - - -
T25 T Avenger White - - - -
T27 T Avenger White - - - -
T28 T Avenger White - - - -
T29 T Avenger White - - - -
T31 T Avenger White - - - -
T32 T Avenger White - - - -
T41 T* Avenger White - - - -
T44 T Avenger White - - - -
T50 T Avenger White - - - -
T51 T Avenger White - - - -
T51 T Avenger White - - - -
FF S Catalina Green - - - -
GG S Catalina Green - - - -
HH S Catalina Green - - - -
II S Catalina Green - - - -
RR S Dauntless White - - - -
UU S Avenger White - - - -
I S Helldiver White - - - -
II S Helldiver White - - - -
III S Helldiver White - - - -
IV S Helldiver White - - - -
V S Helldiver White - - - -
VI S Helldiver White - - - -
VII S Avenger White - - - -
VIII S Avenger White - - - -
IX S Avenger White - - - -
X S Avenger White - - - -
XI S Avenger White - - - -
XII S Avenger White - - - -
XIII S Avenger White - - - -
XIV S Avenger White - - - -
XV S Avenger White - - - -
XVI S Avenger White - - - -
XVII S Avenger White - - - -
XVIII S Avenger White - - - -
XIX S Avenger White - - - -
XX S Avenger White - - - -
XXI S Avenger White - - - -
XXII S Helldiver White - - - -
XXIII S Helldiver White - - - -
XXIV S* Avenger White - - - -
JAPAN AIRCRAFT FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Picture Basing Air to Air Bombing Range Defense Points if destroyed From: Used in:
Color factor factor Factor /flipped
A6M F Zero Green 2 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
1CTF F Zero White 1 - 8 0 1/- PSLG PSLG
1CYF F Zero White 1 - 8 0 1/- PSLG PSLG
1HF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
1JF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
1RYF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
1SF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2SF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
1SNF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
2SNF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
3SNF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
1TF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2TF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PS PS
1ZF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
2ZF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
3ZF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
4ZF F Zero White 3 - 8 1 2/1. LG LG
1ZHF F Zero White 1 - 8 0 1/- PS PS
1AF61 F/D Zero Green 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2AF61 F/D Zero Green 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
3AF61 F/D Zero Green 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
4AF61 F/D Zero Green 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2CTF F/D Zero White 3 2 8 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
2CYF F/D Zero White 3 2 8 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
2HF F/D Zero White 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2JF F/D Zero White 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
2RYF F/D Zero White 2 2 8 1 2/1. PS PS
5ZF F/D Zero White 3 2 8 1 2/1. LG LG
6ZF F/D Zero White 3 2 8 1 2/1. LG LG
2ZHF F/D Zero White 3 2 8 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
AFS D Jake Yellow 0 1 4 0 1/- LG LG
CYD D Judy White 0 2 5 1 2/1. LG LG
D4Y D Judy Green 1 3 5 1 1/- LG LG
HD D Val White 1 3 6 1 2/1. PS PS
JD D Val White 1 3 6 1 2/1. PS PS
1SD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PS PS
2SD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PS PS
1SND D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. LG LG
2SND D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. LG LG
1TD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PS PS
2TD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PS PS
1ZD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
2ZD D Judy White 1 3 5 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
CTT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PSLG PSLG
CYT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PSLG PSLG
G3M T Nell Green 0 3 7 1 2/1. LG LG
G4M T Betty Green 0 3 9 1 2/1. LG LG
HT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PS PS
JT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PS PS
RYT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PS PS
ST T Jill White 1 3 6 1 2/1. PS PS
SNT T Jill White 1 3 6 1 2/1. LG LG
TT T Jill White 1 4 6 1 2/1. PS PS
ZT T Jill White 1 3 6 1 2/1. PSLG PSLG
ZHT T Jill White 0 1 6 0 1/- PSLG PSLG
1CTT T Jill White 1 3 6 1 2/1. LG LG
2CTT T Jill White 1 3 6 1 2/1. LG LG
SA K Zero Green - 6 X 2 0/- LG LG
EE S Kate White - - 6 - 1/- G GLG
II S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- G GLG
JJ S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- G GLG
KK S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- G GLG
LL S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- G GLG
MM S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- G GLG
NN S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- G GLG
M S Jake Yellow - - 3 - 1/- M MLG
N S Jake Yellow - - 3 - 1/- M MLG
I S Judy White - - 6 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
II S Judy White - - 6 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
III S Judy White - - 6 - 1/- PS PS
IV S Judy White - - 6 - 1/- PS PS
V S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VI S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VII S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
VIII S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
IX S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PSLG PSLG
X S Jill White - - 7 - 1/- PS PS
XI S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- LG LG
XII S Mavis Green - - 11 - 1/- LG LG
XIII S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- LG LG
XIV S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- LG LG
XV S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- LG LG
XVI S Emily Green - - 13 - 1/- LG LG
JAPAN AIRCRAFT FRONT SIDE VALUES
Name Type Picture Basing Air to Air Bombing Range Defense
Color factor factor Factor
A6M F Zero Green 1 - 8 0
1CTF F Zero White - - - -
1CYF F Zero White - - - -
1HF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1JF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1RYF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1SF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
2SF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1SNF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
2SNF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
3SNF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1TF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
2TF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1ZF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
2ZF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
3ZF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
4ZF F Zero White 1 - 8 0
1ZHF F Zero White - - - -
1AF61 F/D Zero Green 1 1 8 0
2AF61 F/D Zero Green 1 1 8 0
3AF61 F/D Zero Green 1 1 8 0
4AF61 F/D Zero Green 1 1 8 0
2CTF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
2CYF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
2HF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
2JF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
2RYF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
5ZF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
6ZF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
2ZHF F/D Zero White 1 1 8 0
AFS D Jake Yellow - - - -
CYD D Judy White - - - -
D4Y D Judy Green 0 1 5 0
HD D Val White 0 1 6 0
JD D Val White 0 1 6 0
1SD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
2SD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
1SND D Judy White 0 1 5 0
2SND D Judy White 0 1 5 0
1TD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
2TD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
1ZD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
2ZD D Judy White 0 1 5 0
CTT T Jill White - - - -
CYT T Jill White - - - -
G3M T Nell Green - 2 7 0
G4M T Betty Green 0 2 9 0
HT T Jill White - - - -
JT T Jill White - - - -
RYT T Jill White - - - -
ST T Jill White 0 1 6 0
SNT T Jill White 0 1 6 0
TT T Jill White 0 2 6 0
ZT T Jill White 0 1 6 0
ZHT T Jill White - - - -
1CTT T Jill White 0 1 6 0
2CTT T Jill White 0 1 6 0
SA K Zero Green - - - -
EE S Kate White - - - -
II S Emily Green - - - -
JJ S Emily Green - - - -
KK S Mavis Green - - - -
LL S Mavis Green - - - -
MM S Mavis Green - - - -
NN S Mavis Green - - - -
M S Jake Yellow - - - -
N S Jake Yellow - - - -
I S Judy White - - - -
II S Judy White - - - -
III S Judy White - - - -
IV S Judy White - - - -
V S Jill White - - - -
VI S Jill White - - - -
VII S Jill White - - - -
VIII S Jill White - - - -
IX S Jill White - - - -
X S Jill White - - - -
XI S Mavis Green - - - -
XII S Mavis Green - - - -
XIII S Emily Green - - - -
XIV S Emily Green - - - -
XV S Emily Green - - - -




M =  Made for Avalon Hill’s Midway wargame. 
G =  Made for Avalon Hill’s Guadalcanal wargame. 
GEN = Made in the expansion counters found in The General, volume 28, number 5. 
PS =  Made for the Philippine Sea battles in this thesis. 
LG =  Made for the Leyte Gulf battles in this thesis. 
 
Used in: 
M =  Used in Avalon Hill’s Midway wargame. 
G =  Used in Avalon Hill’s Guadalcanal wargame. 
PS =  Used in the Philippine Sea battles in this thesis. 
LG =  Used in the Leyte Gulf battles in this thesis. 
 
Notes: 
A =  The Iowa class battleships should have armor that matches the Yamatos.  While 
the Iowas beltline was slightly inferior to the Yamato, they did possess superior 
deck armor.1
B = American cruisers (and the Australian Shropshire) are markedly inferior to 
Japanese cruisers in surface combat, speed, and armor factors when they should 
not be.  Allied cruisers were armed with eight or nine 8” guns while most 
Japanese cruisers were armed with ten, which is not enough of a difference to 
cause the Allied cruisers to be one less combat factor then the Japanese.  The 
speed and armor of these cruisers was also close enough to their Japanese 
counterparts that their speed and armor factors should match on their flipped 
sides.  The Japanese Tone class cruisers were also armed with eight 8” guns and 
should have their surface combat factor increased as well.2  The victory points for 
these new values have been increased and are as listed in the Appendix. 
C = The original flipped sides of the American escort carriers had a print speed of ‘1’, 
which does not make sense because they are multiple ship units.  Their speed 
should be raised to ‘2’. 
D = The Kongos had much less armor then their fellow capital ships.  Also given that 
the Hiei was crippled by mere cruiser gunfire in the First Battle of Guadalcanal, 
the Kongos armor factor should drop to 4a.3
E = The Zuikaku originally has a printed value of ‘1’ for the speed on its flipped side. 
The Zuikaku had a top speed of well over 30 knots, and also her sister, the 
Shokaku, has a speed of ‘2’ on her flipped side.  The Zuikaku’s speed should be 
raised to ‘2’ to fix what is almost certainly a misprint. 
                                                          
1 Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, World War II in the Pacific, 146 – 147. 
2 Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory at Sea, World War II in the Pacific, 118. 

















CAPITAL SHIP LOSSES OF WORLD WAR II 
Warship  Nationality Circumstances of sinking 
Bretange  France  Mers-el-Kebir, sunk by British capital ships. 
Provence  France  Mers-el-Kebir, sunk by British capital ships, later 
raised and repaired. 
Richeliu  France  Sunk in port by aerial torpedo from planes off the 
     carrier Hermes.  Later raised and repaired. 
Admiral Scheer Germany Sunk in port by land based air. 
Lützow  Germany Sunk in port by land based air, turned into a gun 
     platform. 
Graf Spee  Germany Scuttled after the Battle of River Platte. 
Scharnhorst  Germany Sunk by battleship Duke of York in the Battle of 
     North Cape. 
Bismarck  Germany Disabled by the carrier Ark Royal and then sunk by 
     the battleships King George V and Rodney, and the  
     cruisers Dorsetshire and Norfolk. 
Tirpitz   Germany Sunk by RAF in port. 
Royal Oak  UK  Sunk by the submarine U-47 in port. 
Barham  UK  Sunk by the submarine U-331. 
Valiant  UK  Sunk by Italian torpedoes in Alexandria.  Later  
     raised and repaired. 
Queen Elizabeth UK  Sunk by Italian torpedoes in Alexandria.  Later  
     raised and repaired. 
Hood   UK  Sunk by the battleship Bismarck. 
Repulse  UK  Sunk by Japanese land based air. 
Prince of Wales UK  Sunk by Japanese land based air. 
Conti di Cavor Italy  Sunk in port at Taranto during raid. 
Caio Dulio  Italy  Sunk in port at Taranto during raid.  Later raised 
     and repaired. 
Littorio  Italy  Sunk in port at Taranto during raid.  Later raised 
     and repaired. 
Roma   Italy  Sunk by German radio controlled glide bomb. 
Kongo   Japan  Sunk by the submarine Sealion. 
Haruna  Japan  Sunk in harbor at Kure during raid. 
Kirishima  Japan  Sunk by the battleship Washington. 
Hiei   Japan  Crippled by cruisers and destroyers, and finished off 
by aircraft. 
Fuso   Japan  Sunk by torpedoes from destroyers. 
Yamashiro  Japan  Sunk by battleship gunfire. 
Ise   Japan  Sunk in harbor at Kure during raid. 
Hyuga   Japan  Sunk in harbor at Kure during raid. 
Mutsu   Japan  Sunk by internal explosion. 
Yamato  Japan  Sunk by carrier aircraft. 
Musashi  Japan  Sunk by carrier aircraft. 
Oklahoma  USA  Sunk in harbor at Pearl Harbor during raid. 
Arizona  USA  Sunk in harbor at Pearl Harbor during raid. 
California  USA  Sunk in harbor at Pearl Harbor during raid.  Later 
raised and repaired. 
West Virginia  USA  Sunk in harbor at Pearl Harbor during raid.  Later 
raised and repaired. 
 154
